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FEDERAL GUILTY PLEAS: INEQUITIES, 
INDIGENCE, AND THE RULE 11 PROCESS 
JULIAN A. COOK, III* 
Abstract: Although there has been substantial academic focus on the subject of 
plea bargaining, the guilty-plea hearing has received considerably less notice 
and criticism. It is this hearing where a defendant formally changes his plea 
from “not guilty” to “guilty,” and where judges are tasked with the responsibil-
ity of ensuring that defendants are making this decision voluntarily and with 
sufficient awareness of an array of critical attendant consequences. Yet, all too 
frequently, courts hastily perform this task, and accept a defendant’s change of 
plea decision without sufficient examination. These problems were on display in 
two recent Supreme Court cases, Lee v. United States and Class v. United States. 
In each case, the district courts accepted the defendant’s guilty plea without ad-
equately ensuring the defendant’s comprehension of a key matter central to their 
decision-making. The Supreme Court in Brady v. United States stated that the 
decision to enter a guilty plea “is a grave and solemn act to be accepted only 
with care and discernment.” However, this “care and discernment” expectancy 
is commonly unfulfilled. This Article will analyze the federal guilty-plea-
hearing process, explain why expediency and facial compliance with Rule 11 
(as opposed to searching inquiries regarding a defendant’s knowledge and coer-
cive influences) characterize federal-court procedure, discuss how these short-
falls affect federal defendants generally, and the indigent and minorities in par-
ticular, and propose a pathway to reform.  
INTRODUCTION 
In 2017 and 2018, the Supreme Court issued two little-noticed decisions, 
Lee v. United States and Class v. United States.1 Lee assessed a criminal de-
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 1 Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018); Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017). 
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fendant’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim that alleged that his decision 
to forgo a federal jury trial and enter a plea of guilty was based on his coun-
sel’s erroneous advice regarding the possibility of deportation.2 Class ad-
dressed whether a criminal defendant who entered a non-conditional guilty 
plea inherently waived his right to pursue an appeal that challenged the con-
stitutionality of his statute of conviction.3 
Although neither case captured the attention of the national media nor 
generated meaningful academic commentary, both cases are well deserving 
of critical examination—less so for the issues presented to the Court, 
though they are meaningful. But they deserve review because of a conse-
quential shared fact. This fact is representative of a commonplace, yet large-
ly overlooked, federal-court practice that routinely disadvantages the indi-
gent (and disproportionately minority populations), and compromises the 
integrity of arguably the most consequential component of the federal crim-
inal justice process. In each case, the district courts accepted the defendant’s 
guilty plea pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure4 
without ensuring their guilty pleas were entered with sufficient awareness 
of certain critical consequences attendant to their change of plea decision.5 
In the end, the Supreme Court rectified the alleged wrongs in Lee and 
Class. The Court in Lee found that Jae Lee sustained prejudice by virtue of 
his counsel’s faulty advice regarding the possibility of deportation.6 The 
Court reasoned that there was a reasonable probability that Lee would have 
rejected the plea offer and gone to trial to avoid this outcome.7 Similarly, 
the Court in Class concluded that Rodney Class’s claims challenging the 
constitutionality of his statute of conviction were preserved despite his 
guilty plea, given that the claims questioned the very authority of the gov-
ernment to obtain an indictment for his underlying conduct.8 
But the Court’s savior acts mask a more pressing concern: why were 
these issues allowed to advance to the Supreme Court in the first place? In 
each case, the guilty pleas were accepted by the district court as knowing 
and voluntary when, in Lee it was not, and in Class it was certainly a debat-
                                                                                                                           
 2 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1962. 
 3 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Class, 138 S. Ct. 798 (No. 16-424) (defining the issue 
as whether a defendant’s plea of guilty inherently waives his right to pursue an appeal challenging 
the constitutionality of his statute of conviction). 
 4 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 5 See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 807; Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. 
 6 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969. 
 7 Id. at 1968–69. 
 8 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 805 (“In sum, the claims at issue here . . . challenge the Government’s 
power to criminalize Class’ (admitted) conduct. They thereby call into question the Government’s 
power to ‘constitutionally prosecute’ him.”). 
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able question. In Lee, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of 
Tennessee had an opportunity to assess whether the defendant fully appreci-
ated the possibility of deportation as an accompaniment to his decision to 
plead guilty.9 Similarly, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia 
in Class had an opportunity to assess the defendant’s appreciation of the 
scope of his appellate rights.10 
The core function of a guilty-plea hearing is to ensure that a defend-
ant’s decision to change his plea is sufficiently informed and voluntary.11 It 
is a decision that is often highly consequential. As stated by the Supreme 
Court in 1970 in Brady v. United States, it “is a grave and solemn act to be 
accepted only with care and discernment,” and represents the “defendant’s 
consent that judgment of conviction may be entered without a trial—a 
waiver of his right to trial before a jury or a judge.”12 And it is an election 
that the overwhelming majority of criminal defendants,13 including the in-
digent and minority populaces who comprise a disproportionate percentage 
of this class,14 routinely make. 
Nevertheless, customary federal-court change-of-plea practice does not 
comport with the “care and discernment” expectancy.15 Expediency and 
facial compliance with the governing rules (as opposed to searching inquir-
ies regarding a defendant’s knowledge and coercive influences) characterize 
federal-court procedure. Defendants are routinely adjudicated guilty without 
a meaningful judicial inquiry testing a defendant’s comprehension of the 
critical attendant consequences or the voluntariness of his decision. And 
given the absence of meaningful academic discussion and national or local 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. 
 10 See Joint Appendix at 60–67, Class, 138 S. Ct. 798 (No. 16-424). 
 11 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b). Rule 11(b) provides that before a court can accept a guilty plea, 
the defendant must comprehend an array of attendant consequences, the plea must be entered into 
voluntarily, and there must be a supporting factual basis. Id. Rule 11(b)(1) delineates the constitu-
tional, sentencing, and other matters defendants must understand. Id. Rules 11(b)(2) and (3) de-
scribes the voluntariness and factual basis requirements respectively. Id. 
 12 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970). 
 13 See THOMAS H. COHEN & TRACEY KYCKELHAHN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DE-
FENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES, 2006, at 1 (2010), https://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc
06.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7C7-YJL6] (stating that in excess of ninety-five percent of criminal 
cases are resolved via a guilty plea); LINDSEY DEVERS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PLEA AND 
CHARGE BARGAINING: RESEARCH SUMMARY 1 (2011), https://www.bja.gov/Publications/Plea
BargainingResearchSummary.pdf [https://perma.cc/BYV7-8NVW]. 
 14 See GLENN R. SCHMITT & CASSANDRA SYCKES, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW 
OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES FISCAL YEAR 2017, at 4 (2018), https://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2018/FY17_Overview_Federal_
Criminal_Cases.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NAF-X33S] (stating that nearly seventy-five percent of 
federal criminal offenders are minorities). 
 15 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1983 amendment. 
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efforts at reform, there is every reason to believe that the inadequacies of 
the guilty-plea-hearing process will persist for the foreseeable future. 
Plea bargaining is the typical precursor to the guilty-plea hearing and, 
over the course of several decades, has generated an impressive body of 
academic scholarship.16 But scant academic scholarship has been devoted to 
the natural outgrowth of the plea-bargaining process, the guilty-plea hear-
ing.17 It is the guilty-plea hearing, not the jury-trial process, that is vastly 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Some scholars have expressed considerable reservations regarding the practice. See, e.g., 
Albert W. Alschuler, A Nearly Perfect System for Convicting the Innocent, 79 ALB. L. REV. 919, 
940 (2015) (noting how plea “bargaining almost certainly multiplies the number of wrongful con-
victions”); Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alterna-
tives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 (1983) (noting a host of problems 
with the plea bargaining system and offering reforms); Stephanos Bibas, Bringing Moral Values 
into a Flawed Plea-Bargaining System, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1425, 1425 (2003) [hereinafter Bi-
bas, Bringing Moral Values] (stating that plea bargaining is a “flawed substitute[] for full-fledged 
jury trials”); Stephanos Bibas, The Myth of the Fully Informed Rational Actor, 31 ST. LOUIS PUB. 
L. REV. 79, 79–84 (2011) (discussing an array of issues that inhibit informed decisions during the 
plea bargaining process); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable?, 97 HARV. L. 
REV. 1037, 1037–38 (1984) (arguing that plea bargaining is not inevitable, but should be replaced 
with a bench-trial model based upon one used in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania); Stephen J. Schulho-
fer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE L.J. 1979, 1980 (1992) (“[A]bolition is necessary to 
avoid egregious injuries that the American plea bargaining system currently inflicts on both inno-
cent defendants and the law-abiding public as a whole.”); Christopher Slobogin, Plea Bargaining 
and the Substantive and Procedural Goals of Criminal Justice: From Retribution and Adversari-
alism to Preventative Justice and Hybrid-Inquisitorialism, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1505, 1519 
(2016) (arguing that plea bargaining has produced “flagrant assaults on [the criminal justice sys-
tem’s] substantive and procedural underpinnings because efficiency has become king”). Others 
have been more measured in their critiques. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Plea Bargaining as Com-
promise, 101 YALE L.J. 1969, 1978 (1992) (“Plea bargains are compromises. Autonomy and effi-
ciency support them. ‘Imperfections’ in bargaining reflect the imperfections of an anticipated trial. 
To improve plea bargaining, improve the process for deciding cases on the merits.”); Nancy J. 
King & Ronald F. Wright, The Invisible Revolution in Plea Bargaining: Managerial Judging and 
Judicial Participation in Negotiations, 95 TEX. L. REV. 325, 397 (2016) (discussing “why the 
carefully tailored involvement of judges in plea negotiations has the potential to contribute far 
more than increased efficiency to contemporary criminal justice”); Colin Miller, Anchors Away: 
Why the Anchoring Effect Suggests that Judges Should be Able to Participate in Plea Discussions, 
54 B.C. L. REV. 1667, 1724–25 (2013) (arguing judicial participation in plea bargaining would 
produce fairer plea-bargaining results); Jenny Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 
YALE L.J. 2650, 2650 (2013) (discussing why Frye, Lafler and Padilla “strongly support a right to 
effective plea bargaining counsel”); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, A Reply: Imperfect Bar-
gains, Imperfect Trials, and Innocent Defendants, 101 YALE L.J. 2011, 2015 (1992) (arguing that 
plea bargaining is essentially a fair process); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining 
as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910–11 (1992) (analyzing plea bargaining through contractual 
lenses and proposing reforms). 
 17 See Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 140 (2004) (arguing, among other things, that guilty-plea 
hearings are “dry recitations of rights and facts” that produce “perfunctory, scripted statements 
[that] are far from full apologies”); Julian A. Cook, III, All Aboard! The Supreme Court, Guilty 
Pleas, and the Railroading of Criminal Defendants, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 863, 868 (2004) (argu-
ing that Rule 11 is ineffectual in ensuring that defendants who enter guilty pleas are doing so 
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more impactful upon the lives of the accused. It is the guilty-plea hearing, 
more so than plea negotiations, that ultimately determines a defendant’s 
fate. The dearth of academic commentary upon the guilty-plea hearing is 
rather surprising, particularly since the problems associated with the change 
of plea process are so pronounced. 
This article will help fill this void. It will analyze the federal guilty-plea-
hearing process, examine its most critical problem areas, discuss how these 
shortfalls affect federal defendants generally, and the indigent class in particu-
lar, and propose a pathway to reform. It will proceed in four parts. Part I is 
foundational.18 It will detail the pertinent constitutional and statutory princi-
ples that guide the federal guilty-plea process. The highlight of this Part will 
be an in-depth discussion of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure, which delineates the specific processes that district courts must follow 
when conducting a guilty-plea hearing. Part II will review the Lee and Class 
cases.19 It will commence with a discussion of the facts of each case, as well 
as a review of the Court’s holding and rationales. However, the Part’s primary 
emphasis will be on the Lee and Class guilty-plea colloquies, which will il-
luminate the critical and consequential problems that are commonplace dur-
ing Rule 11 hearings. Part III will explain how commonly employed modes 
of judicial inquiry (leading and compound questions) purportedly aimed at 
assessing defendant knowledge and voluntariness in effect promote judicial 
interests in efficiency at the expense of meaningful exploration.20 Finally, the 
conclusion will outline a proposal for reform. Specifically, it sets forth gen-
eral guidelines, including a recommended alignment of judicial questioning 
modes with the federal evidence rules, that should be adopted if the guilty-
plea process is to become more effective. 
                                                                                                                           
knowingly and voluntarily); Julian A. Cook, III, Federal Guilty Pleas Under Rule 11: The Unful-
filled Promise of the Post-Boykin Era, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 597, 615–24 (2002) (demonstrat-
ing how judicial employment of leading and compound questioning during the Rule 11 hearing 
inadequately ensures that defendants have entered their guilty pleas knowingly and voluntarily); 
Terry L. Elling, Guilty Plea Inquiries: Do We Care Too Much?, 134 MIL. L. REV. 195, 236–42 
(1991) (advocating reforms for plea hearing practice in military courts); Sarah N. Welling, Victim 
Participation in Plea Bargains, 65 WASH. U. L.Q. 301, 345–50 (1987) (arguing that victims 
should be permitted to express to the court whether a proposed plea bargain should be accepted); 
Prentice L. White, The Judge Made Me Do It: Evaluating How Judicial Expression in Plea Nego-
tiations May Contribute to Wrongful Convictions, 54 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 137, 143–47 (2017) 
(discussing how judicial expressions impact a defendant’s change of plea decision). 
 18 See infra notes 21–103 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 104–170 and accompanying text.  
 20 See infra notes 171–258 and accompanying text.  
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I. VALID GUILTY PLEAS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND  
STATUTORY STANDARDS 
This Part will first explain the relevant Fifth Amendment due process 
principles and their application to the federal guilty-plea process.21 It will 
then explain the historical development of Rule 11, which governs the 
guilty-plea process. Further, it will detail the processes for the entering of a 
guilty plea that must be followed today.22  
A. Fifth Amendment Due Process 
To enter a valid guilty plea, the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
requires that a defendant be competent. In 1993 in Godinez v. Moran, the Su-
preme Court enunciated the governing standard: a defendant is competent to 
enter a guilty plea so long as he has “sufficient present ability to consult with 
his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” and has “a 
rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.”23 
This standard is identical to that required to stand trial24 and to waive one’s 
right to trial counsel.25 
Due process also requires that guilty pleas be entered voluntarily (free 
of undue coercive influences) and “be knowing, intelligent acts done with 
sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequenc-
es.”26 As for the voluntariness requirement, it is settled law that a guilty plea 
induced by the threat of a harsher penalty,27 by threat of additional criminal 
                                                                                                                           
 21 See infra notes 23–39 and accompanying text.  
 22 See infra notes 40–103 and accompanying text.  
 23 Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (quoting Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 
389, 396 (1993)). 
 24 Id. (defining the standard for competence to stand trial as “whether he has sufficient present 
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether 
he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him”); see also 
Godinez, 509 U.S. at 398 (“[W]e reject the notion that competence to plead guilty or to waive the 
right to counsel must be measured by a standard that is higher than (or even different from) the 
Dusky standard.”). 
 25 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835–36 (1975) (holding that a defendant has a right to 
waive his right to an attorney and represent himself but must do so “knowingly and intelligently”). 
 26 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (1970). 
 27 See, e.g., United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 382–83 (1982) (concluding that the 
government did not act vindictively when the prosecutor charged the defendant with felonies after 
plea negotiations failed based on an earlier misdemeanor charge); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (holding that the government did not violate the defendant’s due process 
rights when the prosecutor re-indicted him on heftier charges); Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (holding 
that guilty pleas motivated by a desire to avoid the death penalty are not involuntary); Parker v. 
North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790, 795 (1970) (“[A]n otherwise valid plea is not involuntary because 
induced by the defendant’s desire to limit the possible maximum penalty to less than that author-
ized if there is a jury trial.”); United States v. Kent, 649 F.3d 906, 914 (9th Cir. 2011) (“[A] prose-
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charges,28 or to avoid the indictment of family members29 is not unduly co-
ercive. Courts recognize that pressures are an inherent part of the criminal-
adjudicative process and that the voluntariness requirement does not envi-
sion a decision-making process free of such influences.30 Instead, a guilty 
plea will be deemed involuntary when it is “induced by threats (or promises 
to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unful-
filled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their 
nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor’s busi-
ness (e.g. bribes).”31 Government pressure that amounts to “actual or threat-
                                                                                                                           
cutor who, in the plea negotiation context, threatens enhanced charges . . . may carry out that 
threat if the defendant declines to cooperate . . . .”). 
 28 See, e.g., Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 380 (“[A] prosecutor may file additional charges if an ini-
tial expectation that a defendant would plead guilty to lesser charges proves unfounded.”); Bor-
denkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (recognizing that a guilty plea may result from promises of leniency at 
sentencing or fear of greater penalties following a conviction at trial); United States v. Yeje-
Cabrera, 430 F.3d 1, 24 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[I]f the [plea] negotiations are not successful, due pro-
cess is not violated if the prosecutor carries out threats made during the negotiations that the de-
fendant will be reindicted on a more serious charge which will bring higher penalties.”); United 
States v. London, No. 2:09CR105, 2014 WL 12690892, at *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 6, 2014) (holding 
that the government did not violate due process when it filed a superseding indictment exposing 
the defendant to more time after plea negotiations failed). 
 29 See, e.g., United States v. Brechner, 99 F.3d 96, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1996) (noting that the de-
fendant’s agreement contained a promise on behalf of the government not to prosecute the defend-
ant’s son or wife); Politte v. United States, 852 F.2d 924, 929–31 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 
defendant’s plea agreement contained a provision requiring a reduced sentence for his wife); 
Mosier v. Murphy, 790 F.2d 62, 66 (10th Cir. 1986) (finding that a provision in the defendant’s 
plea agreement required that charges against his wife and mother-in-law be dismissed); United 
States v. Usher, 703 F.2d 956, 958 (6th Cir. 1983) (concluding that the defendant’s guilty plea was 
not coerced when defendant was required to plead guilty in order for his wife to get a reduced 
term); Harman v. Mohn, 683 F.2d 834, 836–38 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that the defendant’s guilty 
plea was not coerced when the government agreed not to prosecute the defendant’s wife in ex-
change for a plea). 
 30 See Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“[A]cceptance of the basic legitimacy of plea bargain-
ing necessarily implies rejection of any notion that a guilty plea is involuntary in a constitutional 
sense simply because it is the end result of the bargaining process.”); Jones v. Smith, No. 2:10-
CV-11600, 2012 WL 4088872, at *9 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 17, 2012) (“A defendant’s decision to 
enter into an agreement that will result in his incarceration is only made because he or she views it 
as the lesser of two evils. Anyone making such a decision, on some level, can say that the choice 
was not voluntary but was forced upon them by the prospect of receiving of harsher punishment if 
convicted after a trial. This type of pressure, inherent in any plea bargain, does not render a plea 
constitutionally involuntary.”); Gatto v. United States, 997 F. Supp. 620, 627 (E.D. Pa. 1997) 
(“Invariably, almost any criminal defendant will feel some pressure when having to weigh the 
benefits of pleading guilty and the risks of proceeding to trial. If such inherent pressure which 
results from the offer of a plea bargain constituted improper coercion, virtually any guilty plea 
pursuant to a plea agreement could be upset at the whim of the defendant.”). 
 31 Brady, 397 U.S. at 755 (quoting Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 
1957) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958)). 
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ened physical harm” or amounts to “mental coercion [that] overbear[s] the 
will of the defendant” violates due process.32 
As noted, due process demands that a defendant have sufficient aware-
ness of various repercussions attendant to a plea of guilty. For example, in 
1976 in Henderson v. Morgan, the Supreme Court held that a defendant must 
understand the nature of the charges against him.33 However, he need not 
comprehend every element of the charged offense(s),34 but only those ele-
ments considered “critical.”35 Satisfaction of this standard is rather lax and 
can be satisfied by a defendant’s admission regarding his comprehension or 
evidence suggesting that the elements had been explained to him by his coun-
sel.36 
In addition, due process requires that a defendant comprehend certain 
constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial, the right to confront 
one’s accusers, and the privilege against self-incrimination,37 that he will 
forgo by virtue of a guilty plea.38 Due process further mandates comprehen-
                                                                                                                           
 32 Id. at 750. 
 33 Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976); Brady, 397 U.S. at 748. 
 34 See Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 & n.18 (stating that due process required real notice re-
garding the nature of the charges and the intent element). But see Bradshaw v. Stumpf, 545 U.S. 
175, 183 (2005) (“Where a defendant is represented by competent counsel, the court usually may 
rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been properly informed of the nature and 
elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.”). 
 35 Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18 (holding that the defendant’s guilty plea was invalid when 
he was not informed of the intent element to a second-degree murder charge); Hicks v. Franklin, 
546 F.3d 1279, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (stating that to demonstrate that a guilty plea was involun-
tary, it must be shown that intent is a critical element of the charge); see United States v. Villa-
lobos, 333 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that “when drug quantity exposes a defendant 
to a higher statutory maximum sentence than he would otherwise face, drug quantity is a critical 
element of which the defendant must be adequately informed before a plea is accepted”). 
 36 Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 (“Normally the record contains either an explanation of the 
charge by the trial judge, or at least a representation by defense counsel that the nature of the of-
fense has been explained to the accused. Moreover, even without such an express representation, it 
may be appropriate to presume that in most cases defense counsel routinely explain the nature of 
the offense in sufficient detail to give the accused notice of what he is being asked to admit.”); 
Desrosier v. Bissonnette, 502 F.3d 38, 42 (1st Cir. 2007) (holding that the lower court’s finding 
that the defendant’s guilty plea was valid since the defense counsel had informed his client of the 
elements of the offense was not unreasonable); Fletcher v. Wolfe, No. TDC-15-0051, 2018 WL 
1211535, at *3 (D. Md. Mar. 8, 2018) (noting that there is a presumption that the defense attor-
neys have explained the elements of an offense to their clients). 
 37 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969) (stating that a guilty plea involves the waiver 
of several constitutional rights—the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, 
and the right to confront one’s accusers); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) 
(same). Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 requires that a defendant be informed of, and un-
derstand, several constitutional rights prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 
11(b)(1)(C)–(E). 
 38 Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (“Waivers of constitutional rights not only must be voluntary but 
must be knowing, intelligent acts done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and 
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sion of certain penal consequences associated with a guilty plea, including 
the statutory maximum penalty.39 
B. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure governs the federal 
change-of-plea process and adds flesh to the constitutional requirements 
discussed above.40 However, the current formulation of the rule differs no-
ticeably from the original version of the rule, which was enacted in 1944. At 
that time the rule was merely three sentences in length. It provided: 
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with consent of the 
court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of 
guilty, and shall not accept the plea without first determining that 
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of 
the charge. If a defendant refuses to plead or if the court refuses 
to accept a plea of guilty or if a defendant corporation fails to ap-
pear, the court shall enter a plea of not guilty.41 
Approximately twenty years later, there were two noteworthy rule 
changes. One was the inclusion of a fourth sentence, which required that 
courts find the existence of an underlying factual basis for the plea.42 The 
second change amended the original three-sentence rule to require that 
                                                                                                                           
likely consequences.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938) (finding that due process 
demands that a waiver of constitutional rights be “an intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right or privilege”). 
 39 Burdick v. Quarterman, 504 F.3d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 2007) (observing that due process 
requires a defendant’s understanding of the maximum prison term and fine); Trueblood v. Davis, 
301 F.3d 784, 786 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Due process as interpreted by the Supreme Court requires that 
a defendant be advised of the consequences of pleading guilty. Not necessarily all the conse-
quences, such as loss of the right to vote or of the right to own a gun, or the effect on future sen-
tences, but certainly the maximum punishment that he faces if he is convicted in the case at hand.” 
(citations omitted)); United States v. Salmon, 944 F.2d 1106, 1130 (3d Cir.1991) (“Due process 
requires that a guilty plea be voluntary, that is, that a defendant be advised of and understand the 
direct consequences of a plea. The only consequences considered direct are the maximum prison 
term and fine for the offense charged.” (citation omitted)). 
 40 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11. 
 41 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 327 U.S. 842 (1946) (amended 1966). The rule was enacted in 1944 
and went into effect in 1946. See Lester B. Orfield, Amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure, 24 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 315, 315 (1949) (explaining the history of the enactment of the 
rules). 
 42 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 383 U.S. 1097 (1965) (amended 1975) (providing that a “court shall 
not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the 
plea”). 
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courts personally address each defendant43 and ensure her understanding of 
the consequences associated with her change of plea.44 
Thus, the earlier versions of Rule 11 only required that guilty pleas be 
entered voluntarily, with a comprehension of the nature of the charge and 
the consequences associated with the guilty plea, and with a supporting fac-
tual basis.45 However, the rule was silent as to the methodology a court 
should employ to fulfill these mandates. For example, the Advisory Com-
mittee’s notes to the 1966 amendment on the factual-basis determination 
explicitly state that courts were not limited to only considering a defend-
ant’s admissions of his alleged criminal conduct, but courts could instead 
rely on a number of different sources.46 
Boykin v. Alabama, decided by the Supreme Court in 1969, marked a 
pivotal moment in the evolution of the federal guilty plea.47 In Boykin, a 
defendant entered a guilty plea in Alabama state court to five separate in-
dictments for robbery.48 The record was devoid of any verbal interchange 
between the defendant and the judge who accepted his guilty pleas, and a jury 
sentenced him to death.49 On appeal before the Alabama Supreme Court, the 
court “on [its] own motion” considered whether the process by which the trial 
court accepted the defendant’s guilty pleas was constitutionally satisfactory.50 
Though the court affirmed the trial court’s acceptance of the plea, three 
judges dissented, arguing that the record was insufficient to ascertain 
whether the defendant’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily.51 
The Supreme Court agreed with the dissenters and reversed the Ala-
bama Supreme Court, finding that it was error to conclude that a guilty plea 
is validly entered when the record is silent as to a defendant’s knowledge 
                                                                                                                           
 43 Id. (“The court . . . shall not accept [a] plea . . . without first addressing the defendant per-
sonally . . . .”). 
 44 Id.  
 45 See id.; FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, 327 U.S. 842 (1946) (amended 1966). 
 46 The Committee notes state:  
The court should satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the 
government, or by examining the presentence report, or otherwise, that the conduct 
which the defendant admits constitutes the offense charged in the indictment or in-
formation or an offense included therein to which the defendant has pleaded guilty. 
Such inquiry should, e.g., protect a defendant who is in the position of pleading vol-
untarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but without realizing that 
his conduct does not actually fall within the charge. 
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment. 
 47 Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. 
 48 Id. at 239. 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id. at 240. 
 51 Id. at 240–41. 
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and voluntariness.52 The Court emphasized that a guilty plea “is more than 
an admission of conduct; it is a conviction.”53 It also noted that several con-
stitutional rights are implicated when a defendant enters a guilty plea: the 
privilege against self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to 
confront the defendant’s accusers.54 When a defendant, such as Boykin, 
faces imprisonment, or even death, the Court declared that the process of 
accepting a guilty plea “demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are 
capable in canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full 
understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.”55 
Five years after Boykin, Rule 11 was substantially revised and much of 
the rule’s current formulation emanates from this amendment. Rule 11(a)(1) 
notes the various plea options available to a defendant: not guilty, guilty, 
nolo contendere, and a conditional plea.56 The conditional plea, which was 
added in 1983,57 is worthy of a brief discussion given its relationship to 
Class v. United States. Rule 11(a)(2) provides: 
With the consent of the court and the government, a defendant may 
enter a conditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in 
writing the right to have an appellate court review an adverse de-
termination of a specified pretrial motion. A defendant who pre-
vails on appeal may then withdraw the plea.58 
As a general matter, when a defendant enters a plea of guilty, he neces-
sarily waives his right to appeal certain non-jurisdictional, non-constitutional, 
and constitutional claims that could have been raised pretrial.59 Neverthe-
                                                                                                                           
 52 Id. at 244. 
 53 Id. at 242. 
 54 Id. at 243. 
 55 Id. at 243–44. 
 56 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(1) (2013). 
 57 Id. R. 11(a)(2); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2), 461 U.S. 1123 (1983) (amended 1985) 
(“With the approval of the court and the consent of the government, a defendant may enter a con-
ditional plea of guilty or nolo contendere, reserving in writing the right, on appeal from the judg-
ment, to review of the adverse determination of any specified pretrial motion. If the defendant 
prevails on appeal, he shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.”) (instituting conditional pleas under 
Rule 11). 
 58 FED R. CRIM. P. 11(a)(2) (2013). 
 59 See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) (“When a criminal defendant has 
solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, 
he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights 
that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea. He may only attack the voluntary and intelligent 
character of the guilty plea . . . .”); United States v. Glinsey, 209 F.3d 386, 392 (5th Cir. 2000) (“A 
voluntary guilty plea waives all nonjurisdictional defects in the proceedings against the defend-
ant.”); United States v. Tomeny, 144 F.3d 749, 751 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Although an unconditional 
guilty plea does waive non-jurisdictional defects in the proceedings against a defendant, . . . it 
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less, there are some issues (even if raised pretrial) that are not waived, in-
cluding claims of double jeopardy60 and vindictive prosecution.61 Such 
claims are jurisdictional in that they address the authority of the government 
to bring criminal charges.62 Class contended that his claims, which chal-
lenged the constitutionality of the underlying criminal statute, fell within 
this framework.63 On the other hand, the government argued that Class 
failed to preserve his claims for appeal since his plea agreement was not 
conditional64 and because his claims were non-jurisdictional.65 As noted, the 
                                                                                                                           
does not waive jurisdictional defects. . . . Whether a claim is ‘jurisdictional’ depends on ‘whether 
the claim can be resolved by examining the face of the indictment or the record at the time of the 
plea without requiring further proceedings.’” (citations omitted)); United States v. Cordero, 42 
F.3d 697, 699 (1st Cir. 1994) (“We have assiduously followed the letter and spirit of Tollett, hold-
ing with monotonous regularity that an unconditional guilty plea effectuates a waiver of any and 
all independent non-jurisdictional lapses that may have marred the case’s progress to that point, 
thereby absolving any errors in the trial court’s antecedent rulings (other than errors that implicate 
the court’s jurisdiction).”); United States v. Nash, 29 F.3d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir. 1994) (“It is well 
settled in this circuit that a plea of guilty waives any defense that might have been offered at tri-
al. . . . A defendant’s plea of guilty admits, in legal effect, the facts charged and waives all non-
jurisdictional defenses including those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the 
valid establishment of factual guilt.”); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 
1983 amendment (“[S]hould the defendant thereafter plead guilty or nolo contendere, this will 
usually foreclose later appeal with respect to denial of the pretrial motion. ‘When a criminal de-
fendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he 
is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitu-
tional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.’” (quoting Tollett, 411 U.S. at 267)). 
 60 See, e.g., Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62–63 n.2 (1975) (“A guilty plea, therefore, 
simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid 
establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is 
validly established. Here, however, the claim is that the State may not convict petitioner no matter 
how validly his factual guilt is established. The guilty plea, therefore, does not bar the claim.”); 
Osborn v. Schillinger, 997 F.2d 1324, 1327 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that “a double jeopardy chal-
lenge to the trial court’s power to hale him into court . . . can be raised collaterally notwithstand-
ing his guilty plea”). 
 61 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30–31 (1974) (concluding that a vindictive-
prosecution claim is akin to a double-jeopardy claim and, therefore, the defendant was not pre-
cluded by virtue of his guilty plea from pursuing his habeas-corpus claim); United States v. 
Brown, 875 F.3d 1235, 1238–39 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that unconditional guilty pleas do not 
waive jurisdictional claims, such as claims alleging vindictive prosecution); United States v. Doe, 
698 F.3d 1284, 1289–91 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting the preclusive effect of guilty pleas and the 
Blackledge and Menna exceptions for vindictive prosecution and double jeopardy claims). 
 62 See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62 (“Where the State is precluded by the United States Constitution 
from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that 
charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty.”); 
Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 30–31 (“[T]he right that [the defendant] asserts and that we today accept 
is the right not to be haled into court at all upon the felony charge. The very initiation of the pro-
ceedings against him . . . operated to deny him due process of law.”). 
 63 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Class, supra note 3, at 3–4. 
 64 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 806 (“The Government and the dissent argue that Rule 11(a)(2) means 
that ‘a defendant who pleads guilty cannot challenge his conviction on appeal on a forfeitable or 
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Supreme Court disagreed with the government and found that Class’s guilty 
plea did not inherently waive his constitutional claims.66 
The amended rule also imposes affirmative obligations upon the district 
courts. To ensure that a proffered guilty plea is voluntary and sufficiently in-
formed, the rule requires that courts inform and ensure defendants’ under-
standing of an array of critical consequences that accompany their decision.67 
Frequently, at or near the outset of the hearing, defendants are informed that 
any statements they make under oath can be used against them in a subse-
quent perjury prosecution.68 The rule further requires that defendants be ad-
vised of, and comprehend, an array of constitutional protections69 that they 
will forfeit if they change their plea to guilty.70 These protections include the 
right to plead not guilty;71 the right to a jury trial;72 the right to have counsel 
throughout the pretrial litigation process, including at trial;73 the right against 
being compelled to be a witness against themselves;74 the right to confront 
and cross-examine the government’s witnesses;75 and the right to present evi-
dence and compel witnesses to testify on the defendant’s behalf.76 
Defendants must also be informed of and comprehend the nature of the 
underlying charge(s).77 As noted, satisfaction of this requirement does not 
necessitate a defendant’s comprehension of every element, but only those 
                                                                                                                           
waivable ground that he either failed to present to the district court or failed to reserve in writing’ 
. . . . In particular, the dissent points to the suggestion that an unconditional guilty plea constitutes 
a waiver of ‘nonjurisdictional defects,’ while the Government points to the drafters’ statement that 
they intended the Rule’s ‘conditional plea procedure . . . to conserve prosecutorial and judicial 
resources and advance speedy trial objectives,’ while ensuring ‘much needed uniformity in the 
federal system on this matter’ . . . . And, the argument goes, just as defendants must use Rule 
11(a)(2)’s procedures to preserve, for instance, Fourth Amendment unlawful search-and-seizure 
claims, so must they use it to preserve the constitutional claims at issue here.” (citations omitted)). 
 65 Brief for the United States at 10, Class, 138 S. Ct. 798 (No. 16-424) (“Contrary to petition-
er’s contention, neither Blackledge v. Perry nor Menna v. New York allows a defendant automati-
cally to challenge his statute of conviction on appeal, irrespective of any forfeiture, admission, or 
waiver.” (citations omitted)). 
 66 See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 67 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1) (“[T]he court must address the defendant personally in open 
court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defend-
ant understands [multiple constitutional rights and certain penal consequences].”). 
 68 See id. R. 11(b)(1)(A). 
 69 Id. 
 70 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(F). 
 71 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(B). 
 72 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(C). 
 73 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(D). 
 74 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(E). 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(G). 
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deemed to be “critical.”78 In Henderson v. Morgan, the Court held that the 
defendant’s guilty plea to an aggravated murder charge was infirm due to 
the court’s failure to inform him of a critical element; namely, the specific 
intent to commit the homicide.79 However, the judicial burden imposed by 
Rule 11(b)(1) was eased by the Supreme Court in Bradshaw v. Stumpf. In 
Bradshaw, the defendant (Stumpf) asserted that his guilty plea was infirm 
because the trial court did not advise him of the intent element of the 
charged crime.80 It was undisputed that the court failed to provide the requi-
site admonishment.81 Nevertheless, the Court rejected Stumpf’s claim, find-
ing that he was properly informed because “his attorneys represented on the 
record that they had explained to their client the elements of the aggravated 
murder charge” and because “Stumpf himself . . . confirmed that this repre-
sentation was true.”82 
Sentencing consequences are also among the items that a defendant 
must comprehend before a guilty plea may be accepted. Rule 11 requires 
that a defendant be informed of and understand the statutory maximum and 
any mandatory minimum penalties,83 the possible payment of restitution,84 
the applicability of the federal sentencing guidelines as a sentencing fac-
tor,85 and any possible fines, forfeitures, and special assessments associated 
with a guilty plea.86 
                                                                                                                           
 78 See Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182–83 (noting the defendant’s guilty plea would have been 
“invalid if he had not been aware of the nature of the charges against him, including the elements 
of the . . . charge to which he pleaded guilty”); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618–19 
(1998) (acknowledging that if defendant was misinformed about the elements of the offense, the 
plea would be constitutionally invalid); Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 n.18 (“There is no need in this 
case to decide whether notice of the true nature, or substance, of a charge always requires a de-
scription of every element of the offense; we assume it does not.”). 
 79 Henderson, 426 U.S. at 647 & n.18 (“[I]ntent is such a critical element of the offense of 
second-degree murder that notice of that element is required.”). 
 80 Bradshaw, 545 U.S. at 182–83. 
 81 See id. at 183 (noting that it has not been held that it is the judge’s responsibility to explain 
each element of a charge to the defendant). 
 82 Id. (“Rather, the constitutional prerequisites of a valid plea may be satisfied where the rec-
ord accurately reflects that the nature of the charge and the elements of the crime were explained 
to the defendant by his own, competent counsel. . . . Where a defendant is represented by compe-
tent counsel, the court usually may rely on that counsel’s assurance that the defendant has been 
properly informed of the nature and elements of the charge to which he is pleading guilty.”). 
 83 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(H)–(I). 
 84 Id. R. 11(b)(1)(K); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 1985 amendment 
(explaining that new federal legislation authorizing restitution to victims of certain crimes requires 
that the defendant be made aware of this possibility). 
 85 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(M); FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 1989 
amendment (“This requirement assures that the existence of guidelines will be known to a defend-
ant before a plea of guilty or nolo contendere is accepted.”). After United States v. Booker, this 
rule was amended again to reflect that the sentencing guidelines are no longer mandatory, but 
merely advisory. 543 U.S. 220, 245–46 (2005); see FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s 
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In 2013, the rule was amended to require that defendants be informed 
of and comprehend the possibility of deportation.87 This requirement was 
enacted in response to Padilla v. Kentucky,88 decided in 2010, in which the 
Supreme Court held that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel is violated when his attorney fails to provide suf-
ficient advice regarding the possibility of deportation.89 The court must 
provide a general admonishment to every defendant, irrespective of a par-
ticular defendant’s deportation risk.90 
Rule 11 also requires that courts ensure a defendant’s comprehension 
of any appellate-waiver provisions in their plea agreements.91 This require-
ment, implemented in 1999, was the outgrowth of a practice by federal 
prosecutors who were including appellate-waiver provisions in their plea 
agreements. These provisions generally require that defendants forgo their 
right to appeal sentencing matters and other post-conviction remedies.92 As 
                                                                                                                           
notes to the 2007 amendment (explaining that the amendment conforms the Rules to the Supreme 
Court’s holding in Booker). 
 86 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (b)(1)(H)–(L). 
 87 Id. R. (b)(1)(O) (2013) (providing “that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a United 
States citizen may be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to 
the United States in the future”). 
 88 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1474 (2010). 
 89 Id. at 1483 (holding that the defense counsel must give correct advice when the immigra-
tion consequences are clear, but in instances where the consequences are uncertain, the attorney 
should “advise a noncitizen client that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of adverse im-
migration consequences”). 
 90 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 2013 amendment (stating that the 
“amendment mandates a generic warning, not specific advice concerning the defendant’s individ-
ual situation,” and that “the most effective and efficient method of conveying this information is to 
provide it to every defendant, without attempting to determine the defendant’s citizenship”). 
 91 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). 
 92 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 1999 amendment (“[A]mended spe-
cifically to reflect the increasing practice of including provisions in plea agreements which require 
the defendant to waive certain appellate rights. The increased use of such provisions is due in part 
to the increasing number of direct appeals and collateral reviews challenging sentencing decisions. 
Given the increased use of such provisions, the Committee believed it was important to ensure that 
first, a complete record exists regarding any waiver provisions, and second, that the waiver was 
voluntarily and knowingly made by the defendant.”). A number of federal plea agreements contain 
appellate-waiver language. See, e.g., United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cir. 2001) (“The 
Defendant is aware that 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) affords a defendant the right to appeal the sentence 
imposed. Knowing that, in exchange for the Government’s concessions made herein, the Defend-
ant waives to the full extent of the law any right to appeal . . . the conviction and sentence, or the 
manner in which it was determined . . . .”); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 
2001) (“It is further agreed (i) that the defendant will neither appeal, nor otherwise litigate under 
Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255, any sentence within or below the stipulated Guidelines 
range of 120–135 months and (ii) that the Government will not appeal any sentence within or 
above the stipulated Guidelines range or [sic] 120–135 months. This provision is binding on the 
parties even if the Court employs a Guidelines analysis different from that stipulated to herein. 
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noted, when defendants change their plea to guilty they necessarily waive a 
host of non-jurisdictional, constitutional, and non-constitutional challenges 
that could have been raised pretrial.93 The emergence of appellate-waiver 
provisions was primarily targeted at those remaining areas of appeal that a 
defendant traditionally retained after the entry of a guilty plea.94 These ex-
                                                                                                                           
Furthermore, it is agreed that any appeal as to the defendant’s sentence that is not foreclosed by 
this provision will be limited to that portion of the sentencing calculation that is inconsistent with 
(or not addressed by) the above stipulation.”); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 914–15 
(7th Cir. 2001) (“Defendant understands that by pleading guilty she is waiving all the rights set 
forth in the prior paragraph. Defendant’s attorney has explained those rights to her and the conse-
quences of waiving all appellate issues that might have been available if she had exercised her 
right to trial. The defendant is also aware that Title 18, United States Code, Section 3742 affords 
defendant a right to appeal the sentence imposed. Acknowledging all of this, the defendant know-
ingly waives the right to appeal any sentence within the maximum provided in the statute of con-
viction (or manner in which that sentence was determined) on the grounds set forth in section 
3742 or on any other ground whatsoever, in exchange for the concessions made by the United 
States in this Plea Agreement. The defendant also waives her right to challenge her sentence or the 
manner in which it was determined in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion 
brought under Title 28, United States Code, Section 2255.”); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 
399, 401 (4th Cir. 2000) (“To waive knowingly and expressly the right to appeal whatever sen-
tence is imposed on any ground, including any appeal pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742, and further to 
waive any right to contest the conviction or the sentence in any post-conviction proceeding, in-
cluding any proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, excepting an appeal or motion based upon 
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel or prosecutorial misconduct not known to the Defend-
ant at the time of the Defendant’s guilty plea.”); United States v. Allison, 59 F.3d 43, 46 (6th Cir. 
1995) (“Defendant agrees not to appeal or otherwise challenge the constitutionality or legality of 
the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant agrees not to appeal the accuracy of any factor stipulated to 
by the parties in the attached worksheets.”); United States v. Bolinger, 940 F.2d 478, 479 (9th Cir. 
1991) (“Defendant hereby waives any right to raise and/or appeal any and all motions, defenses, 
probable cause determinations, and objections which defendant has asserted or could assert to this 
prosecution and to the court’s entry of judgment against defendant and imposition of sentence 
under Title 18, United States Code, section 3742 (sentence appeals).”). 
 93 See supra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 94 Courts have held that, despite such appellate-waiver provisions, defendants retain the right 
to challenge illegal sentences, ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and sentences imposed 
pursuant to an impermissible factor, such as race. See, e.g., United States v. Atkinson, 354 F. 
App’x 250, 252 (6th Cir. 2009) (“A waiver of appeal rights may be challenged on the grounds that 
it was not knowing and voluntary, was not taken in compliance with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, or was 
the product of ineffective assistance of counsel. . . . Although not at issue here, we have also held 
that an appellate waiver does not preclude an appeal asserting that the statutory maximum has 
been exceeded.”); United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891–92 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e reaffirm 
that in this Circuit a defendant has the right to appeal an illegal sentence, even though there exists 
an otherwise valid waiver.”); Hernandez, 242 F.3d at 113–14 (“Even if the plain language of the 
plea agreement barred this appeal, we would not enforce such a waiver of appellate rights in this 
case because the defendant is challenging the constitutionality of the process by which he waived 
those rights. We have suggested that a plea agreement containing a waiver of the right to appeal is 
not enforceable where the defendant claims that the plea agreement was entered into without ef-
fective assistance of counsel.”); Brown, 232 F.3d at 403 (holding that “with two exceptions, a 
defendant may not appeal his sentence if his plea agreement contains an express and unqualified 
waiver of the right to appeal, unless that waiver was unknowing or involuntary. An express know-
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plicit waiver provisions have withstood constitutional challenges across 
every Circuit Court of Appeals that has considered the issue.95 
As noted, Rule 11 instructs courts not to accept a guilty plea unless it 
finds that the defendant’s decision to change his plea was a voluntary 
choice.96 A plea is voluntary when it is “a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant,”97 and it is 
assessed pursuant to a standard that assesses the totality of the defendant’s 
circumstances.98 Given the inherent pressures that characterize the criminal-
adjudicative process,99 government plea offers that encourage guilty pleas 
are not impermissible per se.100 
In addition, Rule 11 requires that a court ensure that a defendant’s 
guilty plea is supported by an adequate factual foundation.101 Courts assess 
the factual basis supporting a guilty plea to ensure defendants have pled 
knowingly and voluntarily, and to guard against the entry of guilty pleas to 
                                                                                                                           
ing waiver will not bar appeal of a sentence when the sentence was (1) imposed in excess of the 
maximum penalty provided by law or (2) based on a constitutionally impermissible factor such as 
race.”). 
 95 See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 27 (1st Cir.) (allowing the defendant to proceed with an appeal, 
despite the appellate-waiver provision, when the lower court failed to sufficiently advise the de-
fendant of the appellate-waiver provision); Jemison, 237 F.3d at 918 (7th Cir.) (dismissing the 
defendant’s appeal given that the waiver terms in the plea agreement were clear and unambiguous 
and the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to its terms); Brown, 232 F.3d at 406 (4th 
Cir.) (denying defendant right to pursue appeal “[g]iven the explicit nature of the waiver in the 
plea agreement, its specific mention of § 3742, and the thorough plea colloquy conducted by the 
district court”); Bolinger, 940 F.2d at 480 (9th Cir.) (holding that the defendant waived his appel-
late rights given that his plea agreement authorized an appeal only if his sentence exceeded thirty-
six months, and the defendant was sentenced to a term less than thirty-six months).  
 96 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(2) (“Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court 
must address the defendant personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary and 
did not result from force, threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).”). 
 97 North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970). 
 98 See Brady, 397 U.S. at 749 (“The voluntariness of [the defendant’s] plea can be determined 
only by considering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.”). 
 99 See United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 209–10 (1995) (“The plea bargaining pro-
cess necessarily exerts pressure on defendants to plead guilty and to abandon a series of funda-
mental rights . . . .”); Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 (“[I]n the give-and-take of plea bargaining, 
there is no such element of punishment nor retaliation so long as the accused is free to accept or 
reject the prosecution’s offer.”). 
 100 See supra notes 26–32 and accompanying text; see also Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 
212, 218–19 (1978) (“[T]here is no per se rule against encouraging guilty pleas. We have squarely 
held that a State may encourage a guilty plea by offering substantial benefits in return for the 
plea.”); Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364–65 (holding that the prosecution did not violate defend-
ant’s due process protections when the prosecution re-indicted the defendant on more significant 
charges following failed plea negotiations). 
 101 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(3) (“Before entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court must 
determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.”). 
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charges in the absence of supporting facts.102 A court’s determination of the 
underlying facts can derive from a host of sources, including statements 
from the defendant and the government prosecutor.103 
II. CASE REVIEW 
This Part will first explain and analyze Lee v. United States, decided by 
the Supreme Court in 2017, with a particular focus on the guilty-plea collo-
quy that took place during the guilty-plea hearing.104 It will then go on to 
discuss the facts, holding, and rationale of Class v. United States, decided 
by the Supreme Court in 2018, again focusing on the guilty-plea collo-
quy.105 This Part will then conclude by discussing and comparing the use of 
leading and compound questions as methods of judicial inquiry during tri-
al106 and during the guilty-plea process.107  
A. Lee v. United States 
In Lee, defendant Jae Lee immigrated to the United States from South 
Korea in 1982 when he was thirteen years old.108 At the time of his indict-
ment, Lee owned two restaurants but was not an American citizen, choosing 
instead to live as a lawful permanent resident.109 In 2008, an informant told 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 467 (“Requiring this examination of the relation between the 
law and the facts the defendant admits having committed is designed to ‘protect a defendant who 
is in the position of pleading voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge but 
without realizing that his conduct does not actually fall within the charge.’” (quoting FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s notes to the 1966 amendment)); United States v. Adams, 448 
F.3d 492, 502 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A lack of a factual basis for a plea is a substantial defect calling 
into question the validity of the plea. ‘Such defects are not technical, but are so fundamental as to 
cast serious doubt on the voluntariness of the plea . . . .’” (citation omitted)); United States v. 
Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101, 106 (6th Cir. 1988) (“While the exact method of producing a factual 
basis on the record is subject to a flexible standard of review, the need to have some factual basis 
will continue to be a rule subject to no exceptions.”). 
 103 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (“The court should 
satisfy itself, by inquiry of the defendant or the attorney for the government, or by examining the 
presentence report, or otherwise . . . .”); Adams, 448 F.3d at 499 (“We need not rely solely on 
defendant’s allocution, however, to support the plea, rather any facts on the record at the time of 
the plea proceeding may be used.”); Goldberg, 862 F.2d at 105 (“[A] district court may determine 
the existence of the Rule 11(f) factual basis from a number of sources, including a statement on 
the record from the government prosecutors as well as a statement from the defendant.”); United 
States v. Stanford, 990 F. Supp. 402, 411 (D. Md. 1997) (“[T]he Court may consider anything of 
record in determining whether a factual basis exists.”). 
 104 See infra notes 108–128 and accompanying text. 
 105 See infra notes 129–170 and accompanying text. 
 106 See infra notes 171–204 and accompanying text. 
 107 See infra notes 205–258 and accompanying text. 
 108 Lee v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1958, 1962 (2017). 
 109 Id. at 1963. 
1092 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:1073 
law enforcement that he had purchased ecstasy and marijuana from Lee 
over the course of several years.110 A search warrant executed upon Lee’s 
premises uncovered ecstasy pills, over $30,000 in cash, and a loaded ri-
fle.111 In 2009, Lee pled guilty to possession of ecstasy with the intent to 
distribute and received a reduced sentence in exchange.112 
During the pendency of his litigation, Lee “repeatedly” expressed his 
concern regarding deportation,113 and each time his attorney incorrectly as-
sured him that deportation was not a possibility.114 And, of particular note 
for this Article, Lee’s concern regarding deportation manifested itself during 
his change of plea hearing: 
Q. [Court:] And are you a U.S. citizen? 
A. [Lee:] No, Your Honor. 
Q. Okay. A conviction on this charge then could result in your be-
ing deported. It could also affect your ability to attain the status of 
a United States citizen. If you do become a United States citizen, 
it could affect your rights to participate in certain federal benefits, 
such as student loans. 
Does that at all affect your decision about whether you want to 
plead guilty or not? 
A. Yes, Your Honor. 
Q. Okay. How does it affect your decision? 
A. I don’t understand. [After this statement Lee consults with his 
counsel.] 
Q. Okay. Well, knowing those things do you still want to go for-
ward and plead guilty? 
A. Yes, Your Honor.115 
During this exchange with the court, Lee plainly expressed his hesita-
tion to proceed with the plea when informed about the possibility of depor-
tation. However, after Lee consulted with his counsel and was assured that 
the court’s remarks were merely a “standard warning,” Lee elected to pro-
                                                                                                                           
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Id. at 1967–68 (“Lee asked his attorney repeatedly whether there was any risk of deporta-
tion from the proceedings, and both Lee and his attorney testified at the evidentiary hearing below 
that Lee would have gone to trial if he had known about the deportation consequences.”); see also 
United States v. Lee, Civ. No. 10-02698-JTF-dkv, 2013 WL8116841, at *5 (W.D. Tenn. Aug. 6, 
2013), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (noting “the undisputed fact that had Lee at all been aware 
that deportation was possible as a result of his guilty plea, he would not have pled guilty”). 
 114 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967–68.  
 115 Joint Appendix at 103–04, Lee, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 16-327). 
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ceed with his change of plea.116 Thereafter, the court made no additional 
inquiries regarding Lee’s comprehension of the possibility of deportation.117 
Contrary to his counsel’s understanding, the Immigration and Nation-
ality Act classified Lee’s crime as an “aggravated felony,”118 meaning that 
because he was not a United States citizen he was subject to deportation 
following this conviction.119 When Lee learned he would be deported after 
the completion of his sentence, he filed an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel 
motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.120 Lee was denied relief by the dis-
trict court, which found that his counsel’s performance was deficient, but 
that Lee did not suffer prejudice as a result of this deficiency in light of the 
strong likelihood of conviction at trial and a lengthier sentence.121 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding that Lee failed 
to satisfy the prejudice prong because “no rational defendant charged with a 
deportable offense and facing ‘overwhelming evidence’ of guilt would pro-
ceed to trial rather than take a plea deal with a shorter prison sentence.”122 
The Supreme Court, however, reversed.123 The parties stipulated to the 
deficient-performance element. At issue was whether Lee sustained preju-
dice.124 The Court stated that when a defendant argues that his decision to 
plead guilty is the product of his counsel’s deficient performance, the prin-
cipal inquiry is whether the defendant has shown prejudice by demonstrat-
ing that there was a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he 
would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”125 
                                                                                                                           
 116 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968 (“Only when Lee’s counsel assured him that the judge’s statement 
was a ‘standard warning’ was Lee willing to proceed to plead guilty.”). 
 117 See id. 
 118 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B) (2012) (defining “aggravated felony” for immigration pur-
poses). 
 119 See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A) (delineating deportable criminal offenses). 
 120 Lee cited two bases for his ineffective-assistance claim. First, he argued that his counsel’s 
performance was deficient in that counsel provided incorrect advice regarding the possibility of 
deportation. Second, he claimed that he was prejudiced because he would not have entered into a 
plea agreement and changed his plea to guilty but for his counsel’s advice. See Petition for a Writ 
of Certiorari at 6–25, Lee, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (No. 16-327). 
 121 Lee v. United States, No. 2:10-cv-02698-JTF-dkv, 2014 WL 1260388, at *15 (W.D. Tenn. 
Mar. 20, 2014), aff’d, 825 F.3d 311 (6th Cir. 2016), rev’d, 137 S. Ct. 1958 (2017) (“The proper 
focus under an objective standard is on whether a reasonable defendant in Lee’s situation would 
have accepted the plea offer and changed his plea to guilty. In light of the overwhelming evidence 
of Lee’s guilt, a decision to take the case to trial would have almost certainly resulted in a guilty 
verdict, a significantly longer prison sentence, and subsequent deportation.”). 
 122 Lee v. United States, 825 F.3d 311, 314 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 123 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1969.  
 124 Id. at 1962 (“Everyone agrees that Lee received objectively unreasonable representation. 
The question presented is whether he can show he was prejudiced as a result.”). 
 125 Id. at 1965 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 
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Ultimately, the Court agreed with Lee.126 In doing so, the Court rejected the 
government’s contention that it should adopt a per se rule that prejudice can 
never be established in the absence of a viable defense to the charge.127 Ac-
cording to the majority, “common sense” dictated this result, for it was clear 
that deportation, not the potential severity of the sentence, was central to 
Lee’s decision to forgo his jury trial right.128 
B. Class v. United States 
In Class v. United States, Rodney Class was a resident of North Caro-
lina who had a valid concealed gun permit issued by that state, but was ar-
rested in Washington, D.C., when he parked his car in a public parking lot 
not far from the U.S. Capitol building.129 It is a federal crime to possess 
weapons on Capitol grounds, and this parking lot fell within this restricted 
space.130 Class was arrested when he returned to his car and a subsequent 
search of his vehicle by law enforcement uncovered the firearms.131 He was 
charged in federal court in the District of Columbia with violating 40 U.S.C. 
§ 5104(e), “Possession of a Firearm on U.S. Capitol Grounds.”132 
                                                                                                                           
 126 Id. at 1968–69. 
 127 Id. at 1966–67 (noting that the Sixth Circuit applied the per se rule suggested by the gov-
ernment in undertaking its Strickland analysis and finding against Lee; however, the Supreme 
Court rejected this approach). 
 128 Id. at 1966. In reaching its conclusion, the Court explained why a defendant with a pre-
dominant interest in avoiding deportation might opt for a jury trial (and its near certainty of depor-
tation) as opposed to a plea agreement (and its absolute certainty of deportation): 
But for his attorney’s incompetence, Lee would have known that accepting the plea 
agreement would certainly lead to deportation. Going to trial? Almost certainly. If 
deportation were the “determinative issue” for an individual in plea discussions, as it 
was for Lee; if that individual had strong connections to this country and no other, 
as did Lee; and if the consequences of taking a chance at trial were not markedly 
harsher than pleading, as in this case, that “almost” could make all the difference. 
Balanced against holding on to some chance of avoiding deportation was a year or 
two more of prison time. Not everyone in Lee’s position would make the choice to 
reject the plea. But we cannot say it would be irrational to do so. 
Id. at 1968–69. 
 129 Class v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 798,  802 (2018); Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, 
at 56. 
 130 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(1) (2012) (“An individual . . . may not carry . . . on the Grounds or in 
any of the Capitol Buildings a firearm . . . .”); Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. 
 131 Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 56. 
 132 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; United States v. Class, 38 F. Supp. 3d 19, 22 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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Class challenged his conviction before the district court on Second 
Amendment and due process grounds.133 The district court orally addressed 
and denied his Second Amendment claim, and implicitly denied his due 
process claim, although it failed to specifically address that issue.134 Class 
later entered a guilty plea to the possession charge.135 The plea agreement 
contained an appellate-waiver provision which primarily restricted Class’s 
ability to appeal sentencing matters and to present collateral attacks under 
28 U.S.C. § 2255.136 Notably, the plea agreement did not specifically re-
serve Class’s right to appeal the Second Amendment and due process issues 
raised before the district court.137 
At his change-of-plea hearing, the Rule 11 colloquy was devoid of any 
discussion that specifically addressed Class’s right to pursue on appeal his 
constitutional challenges to his statute of conviction. However, there was 
ample discussion regarding the general scope of the defendant’s appellate 
rights.138 
THE COURT: If you went to trial and you were convicted, you 
would have a right to appeal your conviction to the Court of Ap-
                                                                                                                           
 133 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. Class’s due process claim alleged that he had inadequate notice 
that it was illegal to possess firearms on Capitol Grounds. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Class, 
supra note 3, at 6. 
 134 See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; Class, 38 F. Supp. 3d at 27. 
 135 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. 
 136 Verdict, Agreement, and Settlement at 6–7, United States v. Class, 38 F. Supp. 3d 19 
(D.D.C. 2014) (Crim. No. 13-253(GK)), 2014 WL 12698681. The Court summarized the rights 
agreed upon in the plea agreement regarding the appellate rights retained and waived by Class: 
A written plea agreement set forth the terms of Class’ guilty plea, including several 
categories of rights that he expressly agreed to waive. Those express waivers includ-
ed: (1) all defenses based upon the statute of limitations; (2) several specified trial 
rights; (3) the right to appeal a sentence at or below the judicially determined, max-
imum sentencing guideline range; (4) most collateral attacks on the conviction and 
sentence; and (5) various rights to request or receive information concerning the in-
vestigation and prosecution of his criminal case. (citation omitted). At the same 
time, the plea agreement expressly enumerated categories of claims that Class could 
raise on appeal, including claims based upon (1) newly discovered evidence; (2) in-
effective assistance of counsel; and (3) certain statutes providing for sentence reduc-
tions. (citation omitted). Finally, the plea agreement stated under the heading “Com-
plete Agreement”: “No agreements, promises, understandings, or representations 
have been made by the parties or their counsel other than those contained in writing 
herein, nor will any such agreements . . . be made unless committed to writing and 
signed . . . .”  
Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802 (citation omitted). 
 137 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802. (“The agreement said nothing about the right to raise a claim on 
direct appeal that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional.”). 
 138 See Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 63–64. 
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peals and to have a lawyer help you prepare your appeal. Do you 
understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you know what I mean by your right to appeal? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Take it to the next court up. 
THE COURT: All right. Now, by pleading guilty, you would be 
generally giving up your rights to appeal. Do you understand 
that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, there are exceptions to that. You can appeal a 
conviction after a guilty plea if you believe that your guilty plea 
was somehow unlawful or involuntary or if there is some other 
fundamental defect in these guilty-plea proceedings. 
You may also have a right to appeal your sentence if you think the 
sentence is illegal. Do you understand those things? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. Pretty much. 
THE COURT: Now, if you plead guilty in this case and I accept 
your guilty plea, you’ll give up all of the . . . rights I just ex-
plained to you, aside from the exceptions that I mentioned, be-
cause there will not be any trial, and there will probably be no ap-
peal. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: Now, I mentioned that you may also have a right 
to appeal your sentence if you think the sentence is illegal. You 
may also have a right to appeal that sentence if it exceeds the 
Sentencing Guideline Range. 
You could also challenge your conviction or sentence based on 
newly discovered evidence or a claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel. Do you understand those things? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir. 
. . . 
THE COURT: Do you want to give up most of your rights to an 
appeal as well? 
THE DEFENDANT: Other than what you mentioned, yes.139 
During the judicial colloquy, Class acknowledged that he understood 
his right to appeal,140 that he forfeited some appellate rights,141 and that 
                                                                                                                           
 139 Id. at 63–66. 
 140 Id. at 63 (“THE COURT: Do you know what I mean by your right to appeal? THE DE-
FENDANT: Yeah. Take it to the next court up.”). 
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there were exceptions to the general ban on appeals.142 However, when the 
court identified certain specific exceptions to the general ban and inquired 
whether Class comprehended those exceptions his response reflected an 
understanding that was less than complete.143 Despite evidence that Class 
did not fully understand the instructions, the court made, at best, little addi-
tional inquiry regarding the scope of his understanding. Class also hinted 
during the colloquy that an appeal might be forthcoming when he informed 
the court that he wished to retain some of his appellate rights.144 
Following the court’s acceptance of his plea, and his later sentencing, 
Class filed an appeal with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
challenging the constitutionality of his conviction.145 The D.C. Circuit, 
however, denied his appeal, holding that his guilty plea inherently waived 
his right to pursue his appeal.146 Before the Supreme Court, Class argued 
that the D.C. Circuit erred in denying his appeal.147 The Supreme Court 
agreed with Class and reversed, finding that the terms of his plea agreement 
did not prohibit his appeal.148 The Court also found that his appellate chal-
lenges were not inherently waived because they challenged the authority of 
the government to prosecute him.149 
The Court reasoned that Class’s challenges fell within the framework 
of two Supreme Court precedents, Blackledge v. Perry and Menna v. New 
                                                                                                                           
 141 Id. (“THE COURT: All right. Now, by pleading guilty, you would be generally giving up 
your rights to appeal. Do you understand that? THE DEFENDANT: Yes.”). 
 142 Id. (THE COURT: Now, there are exceptions to that. You can appeal a conviction after a 
guilty plea if you believe that your guilty plea was somehow unlawful or involuntary or if there is 
some other fundamental defect in these guilty-plea proceedings. You may also have a right to 
appeal your sentence if you think the sentence is illegal. Do you understand those things? THE 
DEFENDANT: Yeah. Pretty much.”). 
 143 See id. (reflecting the defendant’s response of “[p]retty much,” which indicates something 
less than complete understanding). 
 144 See id. at 63, 66 (“THE COURT: Do you want to give up most of your rights to an appeal 
as well? THE DEFENDANT: Other than what you mentioned, yes.”). 
 145 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; United States v. Class, No. 15-3015, 2016 WL 10950032, at *1 
(D.C. Cir. July 5, 2016) (per curiam), rev’d, 138 S. Ct. 798 (2018). 
 146 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802–03; Class, 2016 WL 10950032, at *2 (“Appellant apparently 
believes that the lack of an explicit waiver permits him to proceed in the present appeal. He is in 
error.”). 
 147 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803 (noting that Class’ petition sought the Court’s review regarding 
whether a criminal defendant’s guilty plea inherently waives an appeal “challenging the constitu-
tionality of his statute of conviction”); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Class, supra note 3, at 4 
(“The D.C. Circuit’s ruling was directly contrary to this Court’s holding in Menna that guilty pleas 
do not “inevitably ‘waive’ all antecedent constitutional violations” and that a defendant can still 
raise claims that ‘stand in the way of conviction [even] if factual guilt is validly established.”). 
 148 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 803–05. 
 149 Id. 
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York.150 In Blackledge, defendant Perry had been convicted of misdemeanor 
assault before appealing his conviction.151 Thereafter, he was re-indicted on 
a felony assault charge, to which he later pled guilty.152 In a subsequently 
filed habeas petition, Perry argued that his conviction should be overturned 
on account of vindictive prosecution and deprivation of due process.153 The 
government countered that Perry’s appeal was barred by virtue of his guilty 
plea.154 The Court agreed with Perry, recognizing that a guilty plea waives a 
host of appellate matters.155 However, it reasoned that the nature of the con-
stitutional claim presented by Perry fell within the group of claims that are 
not waivable since a vindictive prosecution claim challenges “the very 
power of the State” to charge him with an offense.156 
Menna involved a defendant (Menna) who entered a guilty plea but 
later filed an appeal arguing that the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy 
clause barred his prosecution.157 The Supreme Court agreed with Menna, 
finding, in part, that his appeal constituted a claim that the government was 
devoid of authority to prosecute him.158 As stated by the Court, “a plea of 
guilty to a charge does not waive a claim that—judged on its face—the 
charge is one which the State may not constitutionally prosecute.”159 
As will be detailed, Lee and Class exemplify standard Rule 11 practice 
and the shortcomings commonly associated with the federal change-of-plea 
process. In each instance, the defendants entered pleas of guilty that passed 
Rule 11 muster in the eyes of the respective district courts.160 Each court 
concluded, among other things, that the defendants changed their pleas with 
sufficient awareness of the critical consequences attendant to their deci-
sion.161 Yet, in each instance the defendants raised issues on appeal that 
challenged, if only indirectly, these conclusions. 
                                                                                                                           
 150 Id. at 803–04; Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 
(1974). 
 151 Blackledge, 417 U.S. at 22. 
 152 Id. at 23. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. at 29–30. 
 155 Id. at 29–30 (“[W]hen a criminal defendant enters a guilty plea, ‘he may not thereafter 
raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to 
the entry of the guilty plea.’”). 
 156 Id. at 30. 
 157 Menna, 423 U.S. at 61–62. 
 158 Id. at 62. 
 159 Id. at 62–63 n.2. 
 160 Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963. 
 161 See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 802; Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1963. 
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Lee involved a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.162 But under-
lying Lee’s contention was the depth of his understanding regarding the 
possibility of deportation, an issue that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 
11(b)(1)(O) specifically requires that courts ensure defendants comprehend 
before a guilty plea is accepted.163 At issue in Class was whether the de-
fendant waived his right to pursue his constitutional claims challenging the 
statutes underlying his convictions by pleading guilty.164 Yet, as in Lee, the 
heart of Class’s claims involved his comprehension of a matter—in this in-
stance, the scope of his appellate rights.165 Rule 11(B)(1)(N) imposes upon 
district courts an obligation to ensure that a defendant comprehends “the 
terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to col-
laterally attack the sentence.”166 
Lee is admittedly a more egregious example of the infirmities that rou-
tinely characterize Rule 11 processes. In Lee, the district court and Lee had 
a brief, direct exchange about Lee’s understanding regarding the possibility 
of deportation.167 In contrast, in Class there was no interaction between 
Class and the court that specifically addressed Class’s core concern—
whether his guilty plea waived his right to pursue his appellate constitution-
ality challenge.168 In defense of the district court, it is arguable that Rule 11 
does not demand the specific inquiry at issue in Class. Nevertheless, the 
colloquy in Class reveals that the court broached the subject of appellate 
waivers during the Rule 11 hearing, and the discussion extended to the issue 
of inherently retained and forfeited appellate issues.169 In addition, there 
were indications that Class’s comprehension regarding the scope of his 
post-plea appellate rights was less than clear.170 
Despite these distinctions between Lee and Class, the respective collo-
quies also reveal certain notable commonalities—similarities that help ex-
plain not only the inquisitorial infirmities in their respective cases, but also 
those in federal courts more generally. To appreciate these similarities, a 
review of certain evidentiary principles is in order. 
                                                                                                                           
 162 137 S. Ct. at 1962. 
 163 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(O) (2013); Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1962–63. 
 164 138 S. Ct. at 801–02. 
 165 See id. at 802–03 (noting that “the agreement said nothing about the right to raise on direct 
appeal a claim that the statute of conviction was unconstitutional”). 
 166 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). 
 167 Lee, 2013 WL 8116841, at *2–3. 
 168 See Class, 138 S. Ct. at 801–02. 
 169 See Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 63, 66. 
 170 See id. at 63–66 (indicating that Class may not have understood which rights he was for-
feiting, as he stated “[o]ther than what you mentioned” when the judge asked “[d]o you want to 
give up most of your rights to an appeal as well?”). 
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III. CRITICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Leading and Compound Questions in the Trial Context 
In the sphere of criminal trial practice, a well-established tenet in regards 
to witness examination is delineated in Federal Rule of Evidence 611(c). The 
rule addresses the concept of leading questions, and provides that such ques-
tions are ordinarily disallowed on direct examination but ordinarily permitted 
during cross-examination.171 The rule states, in pertinent part, that “[l]eading 
questions should not be used on direct examination except as necessary to 
develop the witness’s testimony,” and “ordinarily” leading questions are al-
lowed “on cross-examination,” as well as when “a party calls a hostile wit-
ness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party.”172 
A leading question is an inquiry made of a witness that is suggestive of 
the response sought by the examiner.173 Leading-question objections can be 
sustained on various grounds, including improper phraseology, inappropri-
ate tone, excessive detail, undue emphasis on certain words, and nonverbal 
conduct.174 McCormick on Evidence adds that a question’s detail can be 
“the most important consideration” in ascertaining whether a question is 
leading.175 The treatise notes, for example, that if a “question describes an 
incident in detail and asks if the incident happened, the natural inference is 
                                                                                                                           
 171 FED. R. EVID. 611(c) (2012). 
 172 Id. 
 173 United States v. Ferris, 704 F. App’x 225, 235 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Durham, 
319 F.2d 590, 592 (4th Cir. 1963) (“The essential test of a leading question is whether it so sug-
gests to the witness the specific tenor of the reply desired by counsel that such a reply is likely to 
be given irrespective of an actual memory.”). 
 174 5 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 611:8, 232, 233–34 (8th 
ed. 2016) (“Rule 611(c) provides that leading questions should not be employed on direct exami-
nation of a witness, except (1) as may be necessary to develop his testimony Rule 611(c), or (2) 
where a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party is called to 
testify, Rule 611(c)(2). The rule is phrased in suggestive (‘should not’) rather than mandatory 
terms. The test of a leading question is whether it suggests the answer desired by the examiner; the 
vice lies in substituting the suggestions of counsel for the actual testimony of the witness. A ques-
tion may be leading because of its form, for example, ‘Didn’t he * * *?’, its detail, or be made 
suggestive by reason of the examiner’s emphasis on certain words, the tone used by the examiner 
in asking the question as a whole, or by the examiner’s nonverbal conduct. While not always the 
case, questions which may be answered either ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ are considered leading. Merely using 
the term “whether or not” or other form of alternative does not of itself keep a question from being 
leading. On the other hand, a witness can scarcely be examined without calling attention to the 
subject matter on which his testimony is sought, and a question so doing is not considered lead-
ing.”); 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S EVIDENCE MANUAL 
§ 2.02[4], Lexis (database updated 2018) (“A question is leading ‘if phrased in such a way as to 
hint at the answer the witness should give.’ The essential test of a leading question is whether it so 
suggests to the witness the specific tenor of the reply desired by counsel that such a reply is likely 
to be given irrespective of an actual memory.”). 
 175 KENNETH S. BROUN ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 6, at 17 (7th ed. 2014). 
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that the questioner expects an affirmative answer.”176 Thus, in a bank rob-
bery prosecution, if a prosecutor asks the victim bank teller if the defendant 
demanded that he put money in a bag, the question is leading because it is 
suggestive of the desired response. The question and its accompanying de-
tail arguably suggest that the examiner expects an affirmative response. 
This point has particular resonance in the guilty-plea context, which will be 
discussed later in this Section. 
The rationale underlying the leading-question rule is to guard against 
witness susceptibility to the examiner’s suggestions. It is the witness, not 
the examiner, who is under oath and provides testimony. Thus, it is desirous 
that the witness provide testimony that is truthful and not unduly influenced 
by the person posing the question. It is on direct examination where this 
danger is particularly prevalent.177 Direct examiners and their witnesses 
often have shared interests in litigation.178 This empathy makes them sus-
ceptible to the leads of their examiners. As stated by Professor Michael 
Graham, among the dangers of leading susceptible witnesses is that a 
“‘false memory’ of events” might be induced, witnesses might “lessen ef-
                                                                                                                           
 176 Id. 
 177 Though leading questions are generally prohibited on direct examination, several excep-
tions to this rule have been recognized. These exceptions include questions regarding uncontested 
preliminary matters. See United States v. Garcia-Gastelum, 650 F. App’x 470, 470 (9th Cir. 2016) 
(per curiam) (“Courts have recognized the appropriateness of allowing leading questions on direct 
examination to establish ‘undisputed preliminary matters’ . . . .”); United States v. Londondio, 420 
F.3d 777, 789 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he District Court permitted the prosecutor to ask leading ques-
tions when eliciting information on preliminary matters. Leading questions used for this purpose 
generally are not proscribed by Rule 611(c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence.”); United States v. 
Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 916 (6th Cir. 1972). Leading questions are often posed to minors and adults 
who have communicative issues. See, e.g., United States v. Farlee, 757 F.3d 810, 822 (8th Cir. 
2014) (finding that the district court properly allowed the government attorney to ask leading 
questions of witness who was hesitant when responding to direct examination questions); United 
States v. Wright, 540 F.3d 833, 844 (8th Cir. 2008) (“We generally allow leading questions during 
the examination of children who are reluctant to testify.”); United States v. Grassrope, 342 F.3d 
866, 869 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We have repeatedly upheld the use of leading questions to develop the 
testimony of sexual assault victims, particularly children.”). Courts have also allowed leading 
questions with hostile witnesses. See, e.g., United States v. Meza-Urtado, 351 F.3d. 301, 303 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (approving of leading questions in context of hostile witness who became “convenient-
ly ‘forgetful’”); United States v. Mora-Higuera, 269 F.3d 905, 912 (8th Cir. 2001) (recognizing 
that interrogation by leading questions is permissible when a witness is deemed hostile). Leading 
questions are also permitted when there are witnesses with memory difficulties. See, e.g., United 
States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 761–63 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding that a witness’s 
memory problems and hostility justified the use of leading questions). 
 178 Ellis v. City of Chicago, 667 F.2d 606, 612 (7th Cir. 1981) (noting that restrictions are 
“designed to guard against the risk of improper suggestion inherent in examining friendly witness-
es through the use of leading questions”); SEC v. Goldstone, 317 F.R.D. 147, 163 (D.N.M. 2016) 
(citing Ellis, 667 F.2d at 612); 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 174, § 2.02[4] (“The evil to be 
avoided is that of supplying a false memory for the witness.”). 
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forts to” testify to their actual recollections and instead simply “acquies[e] 
[to] the examiner’s suggested version of events,” and “important detail” 
may be omitted.179 
Waddington North American, Inc. v. Sabert Corp., decided in 2011 by 
the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, is instruc-
tive.180 Waddington was a patent-infringement case in which the jury found 
that defendant Sabert did not infringe plaintiff Waddington North Ameri-
can’s patent “involving metalized plastic cutlery.”181 Waddington filed a 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a motion for a new 
trial, arguing, in part, that relief was warranted given several instances of 
misconduct by Sabert’s attorney during the course of trial.182 In granting 
Waddington’s motion for a new trial, the court cited Sabert’s counsel’s 
“constant and repeated” misconduct, and concluded that there was a “rea-
sonable probability that the jury was influenced” by the improper actions of 
Sabert’s counsel.183 
Among the instances of conduct referenced by the court was Sabert’s 
counsel’s “persistent” and improper use of leading questions directed to 
“friendly” witnesses called on direct examination.184 The court found that 
counsel’s “continuous” and inappropriate employment of leading questions 
ultimately inhibited the jury’s ability to ascertain the credibility of Sabert’s 
                                                                                                                           
 179 GRAHAM, supra note 174, at 233 n.4 (“Leading questions are considered harmful for three 
reasons: First, they may invoke in the witness a ‘false memory’ of events, to the end that his testi-
mony will not reflect what he actually saw or remembers. Second, they may induce the witness to 
lessen efforts to relate what he actually remembers, in favor of acquiescence in the examiner’s 
suggested version of events. He might do so because he is ill at ease in the setting of the court-
room (which is to him at once unfamiliar, formal, public, and intimidating), because he is more 
accustomed to the conventions of polite conversation where imprecision is often inconsequential 
and not the occasion for correction or dispute, because he does not understand the issues at stake 
in the suit, or perhaps because he hopes to speed the process along. Third, they may distract the 
witness from important detail by directing his attention only to aspects of his story which the ques-
tioner considers favorable.”); accord G. Stephen Denroche, Leading Questions, 6 CRIM. L.Q. 21, 
22 (1963) (“[F]irst, that the witness is presumed to have a bias in favour of the party calling him; 
secondly, that the party calling a witness, knowing what that witness may prove, might by leading 
bring out only that portion of the witness’ story favourable to his own case; and thirdly, that a 
witness, intending to be entirely fair and honest, might assent to a leading question which did not 
express his real meaning . . . .”); see also United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 105 (1st Cir. 
2006) (“The evil of leading a friendly witness is that the information conveyed in the questions 
may supply a false memory.”) (citing United States v. McGovern, 499 F.2d 1140, 1142 (1st Cir. 
1974)). 
 180 Waddington N. Am., Inc. v. Sabert Corp., Civ. No. 09-4883, 2011 WL 3444150 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 5, 2011). 
 181 Id. at *1. 
 182 Id. at *1, 3–4. 
 183 Id. at *4–5. 
 184 Id. at *16–17. The court stated that defense counsel “put on the majority of Sabert’s case 
using leading questions.” Id. at *3. 
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witnesses.185 The court acknowledged that improper leading questions in-
variably occur in criminal and civil trials.186 However, the court warned, the 
repetitious asking of such questions is what produces prejudice.187 As the 
court explained: 
[L]eading questions have the effect of preventing the jury from 
making a proper credibility determination. If a witness cannot re-
call the events and has difficulty answering an open-ended ques-
tion, a jury is entitled to find that testimony not credible. Leading 
questions rob the jury of the ability to make that determination. 
Repeated leading questions cause witnesses to become “relatively 
unnecessary except as sounding boards.” The effect is that the at-
torney testifies and the jury is unable to assess the credibility of 
the witness.188 
In contrast to direct examination, the dangers of witness susceptibility 
are not generally present on cross-examination, where witness interests and 
those of their cross-examiners tend be divergent.189 Unlike the typical wit-
ness on direct examination, the witness on cross-examination does not con-
sider his or her examiner a conduit to a shared end. Instead, the relationship 
is adversarial. Given such contrasting interests, the witness on cross-
examination is motivated to correct misstatements, challenge false sugges-
tions, and to include important detail where necessary to further his or her 
interest.190 
In addition to the restrictions on leading questions, district courts are 
also empowered to prohibit the use of compound questions.191 Defined as 
an inquiry that seeks more than one response, compound questioning is 
prohibited on direct and cross-examination. It is objectionable given the 
                                                                                                                           
 185 Id. at *16. 
 186 Id. at *18. 
 187 Id. (“While the occasional improper leading question occurs in every case, repeatedly 
asking leading questions of a party’s own witnesses is prejudicial.”). 
 188 Id. (citation omitted). 
 189 See David P. Leonard, Appellate Review of Evidentiary Rulings, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1155, 
1183 (1992) (stating that concerns of witness bias, witness manipulation, and witness assent are 
generally not present during cross-examination). 
 190 See 28 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 
§ 6168, at 458–59 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER] (“[T]he risks of suggestion are 
reduced where the witness has an interest in promoting a version of the facts contrary to that suggest-
ed. As a consequence, Rule 611(c) generally permits leading questions on cross-examination, where 
the witness usually is interested in defending his direct-examination testimony.”). 
 191 Federal Rules of Evidence 611(a) authorizes a court to “exercise reasonable control over 
the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence” to promote the determina-
tion of truth, to enhance efficiency, and to guard against the “harassment or undue embarrass-
ment” of witnesses. FED. R. EVID. 611(a). 
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confusing nature of what is being asked. Such a “question may be ambigu-
ous because of its multiple facets and complexity . . . [and] any answer[s] 
may be confusing because of uncertainty as to which part of the compound 
question the witness intended to address.”192 
The case of United States v. Abair from the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit in 2014 is illustrative of this problem.193 In 
Abair, Yulia Abair was convicted in federal court of the crime of structuring 
transactions to evade reporting requirements.194 Her conviction stemmed 
from a house purchase in Indiana.195 Abair had intended to secure the funds 
needed for purchase from a Russian bank.196 However, after learning that 
the bank would not wire the necessary funds to her bank in Indiana, Abair 
“made eight deposits at her local bank in amounts ranging from $6,400 to 
$9,800— all below the $10,000 limit at which the currency reporting re-
quirements kick in.”197 The crux of her appeal was her contention that the 
government improperly questioned her on cross-examination about certain 
previous financial filings.198 
Of particular note is the Seventh Circuit’s critical assessment of the 
government’s mode of inquiry during its cross-examination of Abair. When 
questioning Abair about a certain financial document (a Free Application 
for Federal Student Aid form), the court observed that: 
                                                                                                                           
 192 28 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 190, § 6164, at 388. 
 193 746 F.3d 260 (7th Cir. 2014). 
 194 Id. at 261. Abair’s statute of conviction, 31 U.S.C. § 5324, provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Domestic coin and currency transactions involving financial institutions.—No 
person shall, for the purpose of evading the reporting requirements of section 
5313(a) or 5325 or any regulation prescribed under any such section, the reporting 
or recordkeeping requirements imposed by any order issued under section 5326, or 
the recordkeeping requirements imposed by any regulation prescribed under section 
21 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act or section 123 of Public Law 91-508— 
. . . 
(3) structure or assist in structuring, or attempt to structure or assist in structuring, 
any transaction with one or more domestic financial institutions. 
31 U.S.C. § 5324 (2012). 
 195 Abair, 746 F.3d at 261. 
 196 Id. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 263. The Seventh Circuit agreed with Abair, finding that at the time the questions 
were posed the government did not have a good-faith basis to believe that she lied on the financial 
documents. Id. at 264–65. As the court stated, “there simply was no reason—at least, none that the 
government has offered—to believe the filings had any material bearing on Abair’s truthfulness. 
Id. at 264. As we have explained, ‘a prosecutorial hunch’ that the defendant engaged in dishonesty 
is not enough.”
 
Id. The court further found that because Abair’s credibility was critical to the out-
come of the case, the government’s repeated suggestions that she made misrepresentations on 
these financial documents could not be deemed harmless. Id. at 265–67. 
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[T]he prosecutor used a vague and confusing compound (triple) 
question to attack: “And on that form they ask you to state your 
family income; they ask you to state how much you earn from 
working and they ask you to state your assets; isn’t that true?” 
Abair answered (correctly) “Not exactly.”199 
After she later denied (in response to a question by the prosecution) 
having been asked about “the value of [her] assets” when she was complet-
ing her student aid documents,200 the court noted that:  
[The prosecutor] continued with the following highly improper 
compound question (at least twelve distinct factual assertions are 
built into it) that was just an accusatory speech: “In fact, you were 
asked what your assets were and you put in zero for the value of 
your assets in 2009, 2010, 2011. You did that in 2009 despite the 
fact that you owned a condominium and you held bank accounts 
and held assets in the United States. You did that in 2010 despite 
the fact that in the first part of 2010 you owned a condominium 
and in the second part of 2010 you had proceeds of more than 
$130,000. Isn’t that correct?” (In addition to the compound ques-
tion problem, which took things to an extreme, the confusing 
negative in the wrap-up, “Isn’t that correct?” meant that a yes or 
no answer would have been ambiguous.)201 
The compound questioning in Abair was characterized by the Seventh 
Circuit as “vague,” “confusing,” “highly improper,” and “an accusatory 
speech” that rendered any “yes or no” responses as “ambiguous.”202 Com-
pound questions are always inappropriate, irrespective of their trial context. 
However, the extent of prejudice associated with such questioning can vary. 
Abair is illustrative of a context where the associated dangers are quite sig-
nificant. In Abair, the prosecutor’s compound questioning was directed not 
to an ordinary witness, but to a criminal defendant, an indicted individual 
faced with the prospect of a felony conviction and a term of imprisonment. 
Such questioning, especially when it occurs serially and is accusatory, nec-
essarily exacerbates the prospect of jury confusion and unfairly inhibits a 
criminal defendant’s ability to adequately respond and convey his version of 
events. 
                                                                                                                           
 199 Id. at 266. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
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Nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that trial jurors, such as those in 
Abair, are routinely instructed that examiner questions are not evidence.203 It 
is ultimately within the prerogative of the jury to decide which facts to credit 
and discredit.204 Undeniably, government abuses of these evidentiary re-
strictions inhibit a jury’s ability to carry out this function properly. But the 
potential for acquittal remains. Jurors always retain the freedom to acquit, no 
matter how flagrant the government violation. Consider these realities as this 
Part next addresses judicial modes of examination in the guilty-plea context. 
B. Leading and Compound Questions in the Guilty-Plea-Hearing Context 
As noted, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) admonishes 
district courts “to inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant 
understands,” an array of consequences (constitutional, penal, etc.) associ-
ated with a change of plea decision.205 Though the rule imposes upon dis-
trict courts these affirmative obligations, it provides little, if any, guidance 
as to methodology. Moreover, given that Rule 11 plea hearings are seeming-
ly exempt from the Federal Rules of Evidence,206 district courts enjoy wide 
latitude regarding their Rule 11 practices. 
                                                                                                                           
 203 See, e.g., United States v. Munyenyezi, 781 F.3d 532, 540 (1st Cir. 2015) (“Kicking off 
the trial, the judge cautioned the jury that a lawyer’s ‘questions are not evidence.’”); United States 
v. Cudlitz, 72 F.3d 992, 999 (1st Cir. 1996) (observing that the jury was informed that a “lawyer’s 
questions [were] not evidence”); United States v. Buchannon, 878 F.2d 1065, 1067 n.2 (8th Cir. 
1989) (noting that the court gave the jury cautionary instructions that questions asked of witnesses 
are not evidence); Salazar v. Lewis, No. 11-cv-01189-JST, 2013 WL 5228034, at *8 (N.D. Cal. 
Sept. 16, 2013) (noting that the jury was instructed “multiple times” by the court that attorney 
questions are not evidence). 
 204 United States v. Atlas, No. 3:03-cr-66WS, 2007 WL 781842 at *7 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 13, 
2007) (observing that the jury determines whether a defendant has been proven guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt and that it can base its determination on facts not considered by the grand jury); 
Sepulveda v. Morgan, No. C05-5548RBL, 2006 WL 1009223, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2006) 
(“The jury finds facts and it does not determine punishment.”). 
 205 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(b)(1). 
 206 Rule 1101(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
apply to, among other things, “criminal cases and proceedings.” FED. R. EVID. 1101(b). However, 
section (d) of the rule explicitly exempts its provisions from various proceedings, such as sentenc-
ing hearings, as well as the following: 
(1) the court’s determination, under Rule 104(a), on a preliminary question of fact 
governing admissibility; 
(2) grand-jury proceedings; and 
(3) miscellaneous proceedings such as: 
 extradition or rendition; 
 issuing an arrest warrant, criminal summons, or search warrant; 
 a preliminary examination in a criminal case; 
 sentencing; 
 granting or revoking probation or supervised release; and 
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The mandate to inform necessarily obligates district courts to ensure 
discussion of the various Rule 11 line items. Thus, the rule’s plain language 
arguably encourages, or, at the very least, strongly tempts, district courts to 
resort to leading and compound questioning to satisfy their expanding host 
of Rule 11 obligations. The advantages of employing such question modes 
is clear, especially for those judges with crowded dockets; they facilitate 
compliance with the Rule 11 mandates, invite monosyllabic responses, and 
expedite the change of plea process. 
Lee is illustrative. In an attempt to gauge Lee’s comprehension of his 
constitutional rights, the court posed the following multi-layered compound 
question. 
Q. [Court:] Mr. Lee, you have an absolute right to plead not guilty 
and have your case tried before a jury on your not guilty. If you 
were to plead not guilty and demand a trial, we would bring in a 
pool of people from which a [twelve]-person jury would be im-
paneled to hear proof in this case. You would have the right to 
have your attorney represent you at every stage of the process. 
The burden will be on the government to prove you guilty of this 
charge by proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each and every 
element of the offense. 
 You could not be called to the witness stand against your will 
to testify. You could not be required to present proof. If you chose 
not to testify or not to present proof, I would tell the jury that they 
could not hold that against you, that they couldn’t even consider it 
in the process of their deliberations. 
 Now, if you wanted to have witnesses subpoenaed, you would 
have the right to have compulsory subpoenas issued to compel 
your witnesses to come in and testify even though they may not 
volunteer to do so. 
 And if I didn’t say it already, your attorney would have an op-
portunity to vigorously cross examine each and every witness 
brought by the government to prove the government’s case. 
 If you plead guilty today, you are giving up those trial rights. 
There will not be a trial. You will be adjudged guilty based upon 
your admission of guilt if you choose to go forward and plead 
guilty. 
 Do you understand that? 
                                                                                                                           
 considering whether to release on bail or otherwise. 
Id. R. 1101(d). 
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A. [Lee:] Yes, Your Honor.207 
And the court employed several leading questions to assess the voluntari-
ness of the defendant’s decision to plead guilty. 
Q. [Court:] Are you pleading guilty in an effort to try and coverup 
or protect someone else? 
A. [Lee:] No, Your Honor. 
Q. Are you pleading guilty out of a sense of fear, duress or coer-
cion? 
A. Oh, no, Your Honor. 
Q. Then you are pleading guilty because you are, in fact, guilty of 
this offense? 
A. Yes, Your Honor.208 
 Class is also illustrative of these practices. Consider the following se-
lect excerpts, which are representative of the court’s repeated attempts 
through leading and compound questions to gauge Class’s understanding of 
his constitutional rights. 
THE COURT: All right. And you have the right to have a jury tri-
al in this case, and that means that [twelve] citizens of the District 
of Columbia would sit in a courtroom and determine whether you 
are guilty or not guilty based upon the evidence presented in a 
courtroom. 
                                                                                                                           
 207 Joint Appendix, Lee, supra note 115, at 107–08. Compound questioning was also em-
ployed to assess Lee’s comprehension of the nature of the charge and some of the attendant sen-
tencing ramifications: 
Q. [Court:] Okay. You are [here] today charged in a one count indictment which 
reads as follows: 
 On or about January 7, 2009, in the Western District of Tennessee the defendant 
Jae Lee, also known as Jae Williams, did unlawfully, knowingly and intentionally 
possess with the intent to distribute a mixture and substance containing a detectable 
amount of controlled 3,4-methyl-something or other, known as ecstasy—. . . 
 In violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1). 
 A conviction of that offense carries a maximum penalty of 20 years, plus a max-
imum fine of one million dollars, plus three years supervised release or, after a prior 
drug felony conviction, not more than 30 years, plus a $2,000,000 fine maximum, 
plus six years of supervised release, together with a mandatory special assessment of 
$100. 
Are you aware that that’s what you are charged with and that those are the statutory 
maximum penalties? 
A. [Lee:] Yes, Your Honor. 
Id. at 102–03. 
 208 Id. at 110. 
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Do you understand your right to a jury trial? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
. . . 
THE COURT: At a trial, you would have the right to confront or 
have your lawyer confront and cross-examine any witnesses who 
testified against you. Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. 
THE COURT: You would have the right to present your own wit-
nesses at a trial if you wanted one, and you would have the right 
to subpoena them to require them to testify in your defense. Do 
you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: At a trial, you would have the right to testify and to 
present evidence on your behalf if you wanted to, but you would 
not be required to testify or to present any evidence if you did not 
want to. That’s because you cannot be forced to incriminate your-
self. That means you cannot be forced to present evidence of your 
own guilt. 
Do you understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: If you chose not to testify or to put on any evi-
dence, those choices could not be used against you. Do you un-
derstand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yep.209 
The excerpts from Lee and Class are not outliers, but, instead, are re-
flective of a commonplace yet deeply problematic Rule 11 practice. To ap-
preciate this fact, however, it is essential to understand why the rationales 
that underlie the leading and compound question rules of direct and cross-
examination are equally applicable in the guilty-plea-hearing context. 
Generally, indicted individuals must make a critical calculation: name-
ly, whether a trial or a negotiated settlement is likely to yield a more optimal 
outcome. It is a risk assessment that is often stressful, for it typically re-
quires a choice between unpleasant, life altering alternatives. When a de-
fendant elects to settle his case, he has concluded (rightly or wrongly) that a 
negotiated agreement offered the best potential outcome. Accordingly, crim-
inal defendants, particularly those firmly convinced of the benefits of their 
negotiated bargains, enter their Rule 11 hearings as motivated actors. 
                                                                                                                           
 209 See Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 61–62. 
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It is important to remember that plea agreements have no force absent 
acceptance by the court,210 and most plea agreements are non-binding.211 In 
other words, even if a court elects to accept a proposed plea agreement, the 
court generally retains the freedom to impose a sentence irrespective of the 
preferences of any of the parties. And, as noted by the Honorable Robert J. 
Conrad, United States District Judge for the Western District of North Caro-
lina, this reality, coupled with the dimmer prospects that often accompany a 
decision to go to trial, motivate the defendant to reach a settlement with the 
government.212 
Thus, when defendants appear at their Rule 11 hearing, they under-
stand that the judge is the power player who will ultimately decide their 
fate. They further understand that the negotiated resolution with the gov-
ernment is nothing more than a proffered agreement that is lifeless without 
the court’s assent. Accordingly, defendants who elect to change their plea to 
guilty will attempt to placate the court. They will attempt to alleviate any 
judicial concerns. They will appear remorseful and will be accepting of 
their responsibilities per the plea agreement. They will be cooperative, re-
spectful, and disinclined to act or express themselves in a way that will di-
vert from the goal of implementing the agreed upon terms of the settlement. 
Put another way, defendants in these circumstances are akin to the wit-
ness on direct examination. Neither the direct examination witness nor the 
Rule 11 defendant is motivated to correct or contradict her examiners. Ra-
ther, each views her examiners as a means to an end to litigation. Accord-
                                                                                                                           
 210 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c)(3)–(5). 
 211 E.g., Carol A. Brook et al., A Comparative Look at Plea Bargaining in Australia, Canada, 
England, New Zealand, and the United States, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1147, 1166 (2016) (not-
ing that “most plea agreements . . . allow courts to impose sentences other than what is recom-
mended in the agreement”); Robert J. Conrad, Jr. & Katy L. Clements, The Vanishing Criminal 
Jury Trial: From Trial Judges to Sentencing Judges, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 126 (2018). 
Defendants who believe that the submitted plea agreement will likely be accepted and that the trial 
court will likely adopt the sentencing recommendations submitted by the parties might be further 
motivated to forgo a criminal trial in favor of a plea arrangement. See Daniel S. McConkie, Judges 
as Framers of Plea Bargaining, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 61, 66 (2015) (commenting that courts 
“essentially rubberstamp most plea agreements and sentence the defendants according to the par-
ties’ agreement”). 
 212 Conrad, supra note 211, at 126 (“While most plea agreements provide for nonbinding 
sentencing recommendations, which the court is free to accept or reject, they shift the playing field 
substantially in favor of defendants. . . . [P]rosecutors are in much different positions advocating 
for the plea result than they are in advocating for a specific sentence after trial. The adjustment of 
the adversarial relationship, at least psychologically, is a strong motivator to resolve the case 
without trial. A plea deal that takes months, perhaps even years, off the sentence defendants might 
receive if convicted at trial can seem too appealing to refuse. Couple this with the reality that the 
federal conviction rate is currently around eighty-eight percent in criminal jury trials, and even the 
most daring and adept litigators would pause before urging their clients to exercise their Sixth 
Amendment jury trial right.”). 
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ingly, they are inclined to follow the leads of their examiners, to provide 
answers when necessary to facilitate their objectives, and not to vigorously 
challenge arguably disagreeable statements and questions. 
Again, Lee is particularly illustrative on this point. “There is no ques-
tion,” the Supreme Court found in Lee, “that ‘deportation was the determi-
native issue in Lee’s decision whether to accept the plea deal.’”213 When the 
district court raised the prospect of deportation during its Rule 11 colloquy, 
Lee unequivocally informed the court that such a possibility would impact 
his willingness to change his plea.214 When asked by the court to explain his 
response, Lee engaged in an off-the-record discussion with his attorney, 
who reassured him that he was not subject to deportation.215 After this con-
sultation, and despite his expressed reluctance, Lee persisted with his 
change of plea and the court made no further inquiries on the issue.216 
When informed by the court about the possibility of deportation, an 
outcome inconsistent with his principal hope and expectation, Lee did not 
forcefully push back. Certainly, the advice of his counsel tempered his re-
luctance, and this influence should not be overlooked. Yet, it is equally tell-
ing that during the Rule 11 hearing—a hearing where, in contrast to a jury 
trial, he was on the precipice of being adjudicated guilty of a felony and 
subjecting himself to punishment, including possible deportation—his be-
havior was remarkably consistent with that of a direct-examination witness. 
Put another way, it hardly resembled that of a witness who, on cross-
examination, is presented with facts that run counter to his personal and 
litigation-related preferences. On cross-examination, leading questions are 
permissible given the contrasting interests that typify the relationship be-
tween the examiner and the witness.217 As stated in United States v. 
                                                                                                                           
 213 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1967. 
 214 Id.; Joint Appendix, Lee, supra note 115, at 103–04. 
 215 Lee, 137 S. Ct. at 1968. 
 216 The Supreme Court summarized the exchange as follows: 
When the judge warned him that a conviction “could result in your being deported,” 
and asked “[d]oes that at all affect your decision about whether you want to plead 
guilty or not,” Lee answered “Yes, Your Honor.” When the judge inquired “[h]ow 
does it affect your decision,” Lee responded “I don’t understand,” and turned to his 
attorney for advice. Only when Lee’s counsel assured him that the judge’s statement 
was a “standard warning” was Lee willing to proceed to plead guilty. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
 217 Goldstone, 317 F.R.D. at 163 (“The rule reflects the more general principle that ‘leading 
questions are usually permissible on cross-examination and impermissible on direct examina-
tion.’”) (citing VICTOR J. GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 6168, Westlaw (2d ed., 
database updated 2018)); Gell v. Aulander, 252 F.R.D. 297, 307 (E.D.N.C. 2008) (“Generally, 
when a witness identified with an adverse party is called, the roles of the parties are reversed. 
Leading questions would be appropriate on direct examination but not on cross-examination.”); 
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McLaughlin, decided in 1998 in the United States District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, “leading questions are permitted on cross-
examination because the witness is often reluctant and resistant to respond 
directly,” given his “presumable bias . . . for the opponent’s cause, [and] his 
sense of reluctance to become the instrument of his own discrediting.”218 
Had Lee’s relationship with the court been akin to that in the typical cross-
examination relationship, it is fair to assume that there is a far greater likeli-
hood that Lee would have pressed his concerns regarding deportation with 
greater vigor. 
Equally problematic is the lack of engagement by the court. Consistent 
with the mandates of Rule 11, the court initiated conversation regarding 
deportation. However, Lee’s expressed hesitation threatened to derail the 
hearing. When it became clear (rather quickly) that Lee was prepared to 
proceed, the court glossed over this hiccup, continued with the hearing, and 
ultimately accepted Lee’s guilty plea. Akin to the motives of a direct exam-
iner, the court asked a question regarding deportation, and obtained the de-
sired response, which enabled the hearing to proceed to the anticipated con-
clusion. 
 As noted, the array of Rule 11 obligations coupled with its affirmative 
mandates219 certainly tempt courts to employ leading and compound ques-
tioning during their colloquies. As reflected in the Lee and Class colloquies, 
the employment of these question modes typically generate monosyllabic 
responses, which in the Rule 11 context are often unsubstantial indicators of a 
defendant’s knowledge base and voluntariness. Certainly, “yes” and “no” re-
sponses are not per se indicators of a defendant’s lack of comprehension. And 
this is particularly true when a defendant has been sufficiently educated by 
his counsel prior to his Rule 11 hearing. However, at the time of their change-
of-plea hearing, defendants are not frequently well versed in either the partic-
ulars of a plea deal or the various nuances of criminal procedure.220 Former 
professor, now federal appeals judge, Stephanos Bibas, has forcefully argued 
this point. He contends that by the time of the Rule 11 hearing defendants are 
often at an informational disadvantage. He argues that defendants often have 
                                                                                                                           
see also 28 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 190, § 6168, at 459 n.6 (noting that this limitation was 
“designed to guard against the risk of improper suggestion inherent in examining friendly witness-
es” through the use of leading questions). 
 218 United States v. McLaughlin, No. CRIM.A. 95-CR-113, 1998 WL 966014, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 
Nov. 19, 1998). 
 219 See supra notes 67–103 and accompanying text. 
 220 See Stephanos Bibas, Designing Plea Bargaining from the Ground Up: Accuracy and 
Fairness Without Trials as Backstops, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1055, 1072 (2016) (noting that 
“[d]efendants who consider pleading guilty are often poorly informed”). 
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difficulty comprehending the intricacies (certain “technical” aspects)221 of the 
rules of criminal procedure, that they suffer from information overload, and 
that the “laundry list of procedural rights at plea colloquies” provided by dis-
trict court judges produces “a near-monologue interrupted only by the de-
fendant’s perfunctory ‘Yes’ to each question.”222 These plea-hearing realisms 
are illuminated when considering factors relevant to defense-counsel repre-
sentation and the indigent population. 
C. Relevant Indigence and Racial/Ethnic Demographic Data 
Certain defendants are particularly susceptible to these problems in 
Rule 11 hearings. In particular, poor, uneducated, minority, and non-English 
                                                                                                                           
 221 Indeed, the difficulties of understanding “technical” doctrines was on display in Class. See 
Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 63; Bibas, supra note 220, at 1080 (explaining the need 
for lawyers to translate “technical legalese” for clients). Rule 11 mandates that district courts ad-
dress the terms of appellate-waiver provisions in their plea agreements with defendants. FED. R. 
CRIM. P. 11(b)(1)(N). During its colloquy, the district court reviewed these provisions with Class, 
but also extended its discussion of appellate waivers beyond the four corners of the plea agree-
ment. See Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 63 (illustrating the appellate-waiver discussion 
during the plea colloquy). For example, the court inquired whether Class was aware that if he went 
to trial he would have the right to appeal his conviction with the assistance of an attorney, whether 
he understood what the term “right to appeal” meant, and whether he knew that by changing his 
plea to guilty he would “generally” be forfeiting his rights to appeal. Id. To all of these inquires 
Class affirmed his understanding. Id. However, when the court inquired about his understanding 
of those appellate rights that he retained in the event he changed his plea to guilty, Class’s re-
sponse reflected an imperfect comprehension. Id. at 63, 66. Additionally, he hinted that an appeal 
might be forthcoming when he stated that he did not want to relinquish all of his appellate rights. 
Id. At the time of Class’s plea hearing, whether Class was entitled to pursue his appeal post-plea 
was an open question. It was a debatable issue that ultimately divided the Supreme Court by a 6-
to-3 margin. Class, 138 S. Ct. at 801, 807; see also id. at 816 (Alito, J., dissenting) (noting the 
split between the majority and dissent). With this backdrop, it is unfortunate that the court em-
ployed leading and compound questioning to ascertain Class’s understanding of the scope of his 
appellate rights. And despite Class’s statement that he “[p]retty much” understood the exceptions 
referenced by the court, there were no meaningful follow-up questions designed to clarify his 
comprehension, including whether his constitutional challenges to his conviction fell within this 
umbrella. See Joint Appendix, Class, supra note 10, at 63. 
 222 Bibas, supra note 220, at 1074–75 (“Not only are defendants often in the dark about the 
evidence for and against them, but they also have difficulty understanding and evaluating plea 
deals and the likely consequences. . . . Rules of criminal procedure require judges to provide de-
fendants with a laundry list of procedural rights at plea colloquies, resulting in a near-monologue 
interrupted only by the defendant’s perfunctory ‘Yes’ to each question. This information comes 
too late in the process to make a difference; by the time of the plea colloquy, the plea is a fait 
accompli. Moreover, defendants are probably overloaded with information during a plea collo-
quy. . . . Having just endured this laundry list of procedural irrelevancies, defendants have difficul-
ty understanding and focusing on the substantive merits of the deal. . . . [D]efendants may find it 
hard to understand technical doctrines (such as mens rea and accomplice liability) and evaluate the 
proof needed for each one. . . . And usually the colloquy does not cover so-called collateral conse-
quences because they are nominally civil, such as deportation, sex-offender registration, or re-
strictions on residency or employment.”). 
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speaking populations are the most disadvantaged by these tendencies. Crim-
inal defense attorneys are ethically required to provide competent represen-
tation.223 This responsibility necessarily requires that an attorney act with 
“reasonable diligence and promptness.”224 This expectation further envi-
sions an attorney who maintains a reasonable workload.225 To that end, law-
yers are expected to decline accepting new cases or, when reasonably possi-
ble, withdraw from a case if such representation will violate this man-
date.226 
However, in the federal system the fulfillment of these ethical obliga-
tions, particularly in the context of indigent representation, is often tested. In 
2014, approximately 78% of federal defendants were deemed indigent and 
were represented by a public defender or an attorney appointed pursuant to 
                                                                                                                           
 223 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (“A lawyer shall pro-
vide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, 
skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 224 Id. r. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a 
client.”). 
 225 Id. r. 1.3 cmt. 2 (“A lawyer’s work load must be controlled so that each matter can be han-
dled competently.”); Peter A. Joy & Kevin C. McMunigal, Does the Lawyer Make a Difference? 
Public Defender v. Appointed Counsel, 27 CRIM. JUST. 46, 47 (2012) (“The Rand study’s findings 
have significant ethical implications. First and foremost is the failure to fulfill what is perhaps the 
most fundamental of all ethical duties, the duty to provide competent representation, set forth in 
Model Rule 1.1. Lack of adequate compensation and resources also put at risk the lawyer’s duty to 
keep a client informed about key aspects of the case as required by Model Rule 1.4. The Rand 
study noted that public defenders tend to spend more time communicating with clients than ap-
pointed lawyers. Taking on more cases than a lawyer can handle due to financial pressure is con-
trary to Comment [1] to Model Rule 1.16, stating that a lawyer ‘should not accept representation 
in a matter unless it can be performed competently, promptly, . . . and to completion.’”). 
 226 Model Rule of Professional Conduct rule 1.16 provides in pertinent part: 
(a) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer shall not represent a client or, where 
representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client if: 
 (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct 
or other law; 
 . . . 
 (b) Except as stated in paragraph (c), a lawyer may withdraw from representing a 
client if : 
 (1) withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the inter-
ests of the client; 
 . . . 
 (7) other good cause for withdrawal exists. 
 (c) A lawyer must comply with applicable law requiring notice to or permission 
of a tribunal when terminating a representation. When ordered to do so by a tribunal, 
a lawyer shall continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating 
the representation. 
MODEL RULE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.16. 
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the Criminal Justice Act Panel (CJA).227 Public defenders and CJA lawyers 
represented 38% and 39% of indigent defendants, respectively.228 Though 
public defender caseloads are comparatively more burdensome at the state 
level,229 many federal public defender offices experience similar hardships.230 
Unlike public defenders who are salaried employees, CJA attorneys bill the 
government for their services. However, their fees are subject to statutorily-
imposed ceilings and are less generous than the fees earned through retained 
clients.231 Currently, CJA lawyers are paid a maximum rate of $140/hour in 
non-capital felony cases, with a cap fee of $10,900 for non-capital felonies, 
                                                                                                                           
 227 MARK MOTIVANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS 2013–2014, at 1, 28 (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs1314.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/94FZ-4BA4] [hereinafter FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2013–2014]; Adam 
Liptak, Gap Seen Between Court-Appointed Lawyers and Public Defenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/13/us/13cnd-defenders.html [https://perma.cc/HH5G-
GYYM] (“Roughly three quarters of all federal defendants rely on lawyers paid for by the gov-
ernment, about evenly divided between salaried public defenders and appointed lawyers paid by 
the hour.”). 
 228 FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2013–2014, supra note 227, at 29. 
 229 Bibas, supra note 220, at 1075–76 (“Defense lawyers . . . may not have enough time to coun-
sel their clients and weigh options, and may even ‘meet ’em and plead ’em’ at the initial appearance. 
They may be consciously or unconsciously biased by their workloads and incentives to close cases. 
They may also sometimes find it difficult to build mutual trust and get their clients to understand the 
pros and cons of various options.”); Andrew Cohen, Eric Holder: A ‘State of Crisis’ for the Right to 
Counsel, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 15, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2013/03/
eric-holder-a-state-of-crisis-for-the-right-to-counsel/274074/ [https://perma.cc/CGC6-ZX3B] (noting 
that then-Attorney General Eric Holder declared that the indigent defense system was in a crisis 
and that “far too many children and adults routinely enter our juvenile and criminal justice systems 
with little understanding of the rights to which they’re entitled, the charges against them, or the 
potential sentences they may face”); Alexa Van Brunt, Poor People Rely on Public Defenders Who 
Are Too Overworked to Defend Them, THE GUARDIAN (June 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.
com/commentisfree/2015/jun/17/poor-rely-public-defenders-too-overworked [https://perma.cc/
GG54-37NE] (noting that in excess of eighty percent of individuals charged with felonies are 
indigent, that large public defender caseloads contribute to increased reliance on plea bargaining, 
“and result in a ‘meet ’em and plead ’em’ system of justice, in which clients have little more than 
a brief conversation in the courtroom with a harried public defender before pleading guilty”); 
Teresa Wiltz, Public Defenders Fight Back Against Budget Cuts, Growing Caseloads, HUFFING-
TON POST (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/public-defenders-fight-back-
against-budget-cuts-growing_us_5a1440d3e4b08b00ba67341f [https://perma.cc/MSA2-Q96D] 
(noting that the restricted budgets and large caseloads of public defenders have produced a host of 
problems, including defendants often pleading guilty to crimes “even if they’re not guilty, just so 
they can get out of jail and get on with their lives, often not fully understanding the consequences”). 
 230 Luis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1083, 1095 (2016) (“As the Department of Justice ex-
plains, only 27 percent of county-based public defender offices have sufficient attorneys to meet 
nationally recommended caseload standards. And as one amicus points out, ‘[m]any federal public 
defender organizations and lawyers appointed under the Criminal Justice Act serve numerous 
clients and have only limited resources.’” (citations omitted)). 
 231 Defender Services, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/services-forms/defender-services 
[https://perma.cc/7L7Q-DLJV] (describing the basic structure of federal indigent defense repre-
sentation). 
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and $3,100 for misdemeanors.232 Though the indigent are spared the financial 
costs associated with their legal defense, they often sustain other meaningful 
non-monetary costs. One study found that in comparison with public defend-
ers, appointed counsel “tend to be quite young,” graduate from less prestig-
ious law schools, have smaller practices, are “less qualified,” and “tend to do 
less well in plea negotiations.”233 That same study also found that defendants 
represented by court-appointed counsel “received substantially longer sen-
tences,” and that appointed counsel “are less adept at assessing which cases to 
pursue through trial and at negotiating with prosecutors.”234 
According to data compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the in-
digent population is diverse, with approximately 65% of African-American, 
57% of white, and 56% of Hispanic defendants having been assigned feder-
al counsel in 1998.235 Moreover, the indigent population consists dispropor-
tionately of minorities,236 and generally less educated people, with 70.2% of 
                                                                                                                           
 232 7 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY §§ 230.16, 230.23.
20, https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/vol07a-ch02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2JLB-LCC9]. 
 233 Liptak, supra note 227. Another study compared plea rates between defendants with re-
tained attorneys and those with appointed counsel. David E. Patton, Federal Public Defense in an 
Age of Inquisition, 122 YALE L.J. 2578, 2585 (2013) (“The Allen Report found two statistics—the 
high rate of guilty pleas and the disparity in plea rates between those with retained counsel and 
those with assigned counsel—particularly telling evidence of the damage to the adversarial system 
from the lack of adequate counsel. In the districts that they studied, researchers found the follow-
ing guilty plea rates for defendants with retained counsel versus defendants with assigned counsel: 
in the Northern District of California, San Francisco, the guilty plea rate was 68% for retained, 
81% for assigned; in the Northern District of California, Sacramento, 60% for retained, 82% for 
assigned; in the Northern District of Illinois, 47% for retained, 87% for assigned; and in the Dis-
trict of Connecticut, 56% for retained, 71% for assigned.”). 
 234 Adam Liptak, supra note 227. 
 235 CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINAL 
CASES 9 (2000), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dccc.pdf [https://perma.cc/RBN5-XDSR]. 
 236 ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, MINOR 
CRIMES MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS 
47 (2009), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/misdemeanor_20090401.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/S45Q-DTXR] (“Although actual statistics are rare, public defenders across the 
county report that their clients are almost entirely Black or Hispanic.” Citing higher instances of 
arrests and poverty as contributing explanations.); Peter A. Joy, Unequal Assistance of Counsel, 
24 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 518, 519 (2015) (“If one does not have the financial means to hire 
effective counsel, or is poor and not lucky enough to have a well-funded, effective public defender 
or appointed counsel, the defendant’s right to counsel is unequal. This disparity is driven largely 
by the wealth of the accused and falls most harshly on people of color, who are twice as likely as 
whites to live in poverty and are accused of crimes at rates much higher than their proportion of 
the population.”); Patton, supra note 233, at 2591 (“[T]he Federal Defenders of New York, is the 
public defender office for the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York. Those two districts 
cover all of New York City, Long Island, and several counties north of the city. Roughly seventy 
percent of the federal defendants in the districts are black or Hispanic, nearly double the percent-
age of the general population. About eighty percent of the districts’ defendants require assigned 
counsel.”).  
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indigent inmates having less than a high school education.237 Notably, there 
has been a marked increase in recent years in the demand for interpreters. In 
2002, interpreters used in federal-court proceedings totaled 174,405.238 
However, in 2016 and 2017 the numbers significantly increased, totaling 
265,888 and 239,912, respectively.239 And given President Trump’s “zero 
tolerance” immigration policies, few will be surprised if future statistical 
compilations demonstrate a noticeable increase in these figures.240 
Well-trained and properly employed interpreters can certainly mitigate 
the problems that inevitably accompany language barriers in the criminal 
courtroom. Yet, the heightened priority of immigration prosecutions has 
produced such a spike in demand for interpreters that “filling the need has 
not been easy.”241 It has “led to logistical problems in court,” has “frus-
trat[ed] . . . defense attorneys” as they “struggle to communicate basic legal 
concepts to their clients,” and has the defense community “concern[ed] . . . 
that due process is being skirted.”242 In addition, the steep increase in immi-
gration prosecutions “ha[s] swelled the dockets of the courts,” and 
“strain[ed] the time and resources of judges, clerks, prosecutors, [and] pub-
lic defenders.”243 In McAllen, Texas, “the epicenter of zero tolerance,” ille-
gal-entry prosecutions increased over 300% in the past year.244 As a result, 
the eighteen federal public defenders in McAllen typically consult with cli-
ents for “only a few minutes, just long enough to prepare people to plead 
guilty.”245 
Thus, it is the poor, the uneducated, minorities, and non-English speak-
ing defendants who are most disadvantaged by the federal courts’ Rule 11 
proclivities. It is these individuals who are most vulnerable to the question-
                                                                                                                           
 237 HARLOW, supra note 235, at 9. 
 238 LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORT OF 
THE DIRECTOR 23 (2002), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/annual_report_2002.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/24DG-SL9X]. 
 239 Court Operations and Case Management Annual Report 2017, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE 
U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/court-operations-and-case-management-
annual-report-2017 [https://perma.cc/CR48-566S]. 
 240 In 2018, President Donald Trump introduced a policy to criminally prosecute anyone who 
crossed the border illegally. Kristina Davis, As Courtrooms Grow More Diverse Under ‘Zero Toler-
ance,’ Difficulty Finding Interpreters Leads to Frustration, SAN DIEGO TRIB. (Sept. 2, 2018), http://
www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/courts/sd-me-court-interpreters-20180902-story.html [https:
//perma.cc/8YGQ-KQVZ]. This came to be known as his “zero tolerance” policy. Id. 
 241 Id. 
 242 Id. 
 243 Julia Preston, Zero Tolerance Lives On, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 14, 2018), https://
www.themarshallproject.org/2018/09/14/zero-tolerance-lives-on?ref=hp-4-122 [https://perma.cc/
BZ9R-GJQ6]. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id. 
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able modes of inquiry commonly employed by federal district court judges. 
During direct examination in a trial setting, monosyllabic utterances in re-
sponse to improper leading and compound questions would not be credited 
as particularly probative. The primary rationale underlying the leading-
question prohibition is “to prevent the substitution of the attorney’s lan-
guage for the thoughts of the witness as to material facts in dispute.”246 And 
the inherent confusion associated with compound questions renders such 
queries improper regardless of their trial context.247 Just as witness respons-
es to such questions in the trial setting are, and should be, properly dis-
counted, there is no sound reason to routinely credit such responses in the 
Rule 11 setting. 
Yet, this is precisely what happens when appellate petitions are filed, 
challenging the modes of judicial questioning during their Rule 11 hearings. 
Such challenges are routinely rejected by the circuit courts.248 Illustrative is 
the 2005 case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, United 
States v. Gardner.249 There, the defendant (Gardner) sought to have his 
guilty plea to narcotics and weapons charges set aside because there was no 
written plea agreement and no “meaningful interaction” between the court 
and the defendant during their Rule 11 colloquy.250 He asserted that the 
“plea colloquy did not satisfy the ‘core concerns’ of Rule 11,” and that the 
court neglected to “thorough[ly] review . . . the oral plea agreement.”251 In 
                                                                                                                           
 246 81 AM. JUR. 2D Witnesses § 659 (2019); see also 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 472 (2018) (“Lead-
ing questions are generally not permitted on direct examination, especially if the witness is friend-
ly and willing. This restriction is intended to prevent the substitution of the language of the attor-
ney for the thoughts of the witness as to material facts in dispute and to prevent shaping and creat-
ing evidence—whether inadvertently or intentionally—that conforms to the interrogator’s version 
of the facts.”). 
 247 See 28 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 192, § 6164, at 388. 
 248 United States v. Vargas, 291 F. App’x 450, 452 (2d Cir. 2008) (rejecting defendant’s claim 
that his guilty plea was involuntary, finding that his monosyllabic responses did not demonstrate 
ineffectiveness); United States v. Torrellas, 455 F.3d 96, 103 (2d Cir. 2006) (concluding that 
“monosyllabic ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ responses” to judicial inquiries did not render guilty plea invalid); 
United States v. Rodríguez-León, 402 F.3d 17, 25 & n.8 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding that single-word 
responses during plea colloquy were insufficient to establish that defendant did not comprehend 
the nature of the charges); Spikes v. Graham, No. 9:07-CV-1129, 2010 WL 4005044, at *7 
(N.D.N.Y. July 14, 2010) (rejecting defendant’s “claim[] that his monosyllabic responses and the 
fact that he did not provide details of the crime indicate that he did not have a rational and factual 
understanding of the plea proceedings”); Flores v. Cockrell, No. CIV. SA-98-CA-1169OG, 2003 
WL 1957131, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2003) (rejecting the claim that the defendant’s guilty 
plea was invalid due to being in a “frozen state,” and the court held that monosyllabic responses 
during the plea hearing failed to establish defendant’s claim). 
 249 United States v. Gardner, 417 F.3d 541 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 250 Id. at 544. 
 251 Id. (“Gardner contends that his plea colloquy did not satisfy the ‘core concerns’ of Rule 11 
as articulated in United States v. DeBusk; namely, ‘Was the plea coerced? Does the accused un-
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support, he specifically cited the mode of inquiry employed by the court 
during the Rule 11 hearing, noting that it “required only a yes-or-no an-
swer” to most questions.252 However, the Sixth Circuit briskly dismissed 
Gardner’s claim.253 Finding that his guilty plea was entered knowingly and 
voluntarily, the court reasoned, in part, that the nature of the charges “were 
read aloud,” and that the sentencing consequences “for each offense were 
explained to Gardner.”254 It added that the court “addressed” with Gardner 
his various constitutional rights as well as the burden placed upon the gov-
ernment.255 Further, it noted that Gardner indicated that he understood the 
nature of the offense, the various rights he was forgoing, the consequences 
attendant to this guilty plea, and that he acknowledged his guilt.256 
Of particular note is the Sixth Circuit’s specific address of Gardner’s 
monosyllabic claim that was at the heart of his appeal. In a single sentence, 
the court abruptly concluded that such one-word responses were valid indi-
cators of a defendant’s knowledge and voluntariness.257 
[T]here is no requirement that in order to rely on a defendant’s an-
swer in a guilty-plea colloquy to conclude that the defendant plead-
ed guilty knowingly and voluntarily, those answers must be lengthy 
and all-encompassing; a straightforward and simple “Yes, your 
Honor” is sufficient to bind a defendant to its consequences.258 
The Sixth Circuit is correct in stating that neither the plain language of 
Rule 11 nor its appellate-court construction requires that defendants’ an-
swers be “lengthy and all-encompassing.” However, this reality underscores 
the problem. Rule 11 is silent as to methodology, the district courts have 
routinely employed leading and compound questioning to comply with its 
mandates, and the courts of appeals have sanctioned the process. Though 
                                                                                                                           
derstand the nature of the charges? And does the accused understand the consequences of the 
plea?’ Specifically, he claims that the district court failed ‘to provide a thorough review of the oral 
plea agreement.’” (citations omitted)). 
 252 Id. (noting Gardner’s claim that the court’s mode of inquiry which generated mostly sin-
gle-word responses “render[ed] their exchange meaningless”). 
 253 Id. 
 254 Id. (emphases added) (“At Gardner’s plea hearing, the district court carefully reviewed 
with him the provisions of the plea agreement and the rights that he was waiving as a result of 
pleading guilty. The charges in the indictment were read aloud, and the penalties for each offense 
were explained to Gardner.”). 
 255 Id. (noting that the district court “addressed Gardner’s right to a trial by jury, his right not 
to testify, the presumption of innocence, and the government’s burden of proof”). 
 256 Id. (“Before his plea was entered, Gardner stated that he understood the nature of the of-
fenses and acknowledged his guilt. He also said that he understood the consequences of his plea 
and the rights that he was waiving by pleading guilty.”). 
 257 Id. 
 258 Id. 
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monosyllabic responses are not per se indicators of insufficient comprehen-
sion and involuntariness, in the context of Rule 11 hearings the all-
encompassing view expressed by the Sixth Circuit is far too sweeping. It 
flatly ignores the underlying dynamics of the judge-defendant relationship 
that too often renders monosyllabic responses insufficient indicators of de-
fendant comprehension and voluntariness. It is also suggestive of an unfor-
tunate value priority; one that is misplaced or is the product of misinfor-
mation. It is a perspective that plainly exalts judicial economy and expedi-
ency above probing inquiries and genuine concern for truth. And it is a view 
that unambiguously communicates to district courts that facial compliance 
with the rule is acceptable judicial practice. 
CONCLUSION 
It is difficult to envision a leading or compound question during a trial 
that can be as forceful and as dangerous as one asked during a Rule 11 hear-
ing. At a trial, the trier of fact possesses the authority to decide which facts 
to believe and which not to believe. It decides how much weight, if any, a 
particular piece of evidence should be credited. Accordingly, in a trial set-
ting, a trier of fact may choose to disregard or discredit the significance of 
testimony that stems from the most blatant and objectionable leading and/or 
compound questions. However, in the Rule 11 context the defendant makes 
a decision to change her plea to guilty. There is no trier of fact attempting to 
ascertain guilt or innocence. Rather, the judge’s role is to ascertain whether 
the defendant is entering a plea voluntarily and with sufficient comprehen-
sion of certain attendant consequences. Rule 11 specifies the process that 
courts must follow when performing this function, but it also entices courts 
to ascertain knowledge and voluntariness by probing defendants through 
leading and compound questions. As this Article demonstrates, this deeply 
flawed process of inquiry effectively glides too many defendants into guilt 
admissions without a true and meaningful judicial inquiry. 
This practice—all too common in the federal courts—can be mitigated 
by amending Rule 11 to require a substantial uptick in the defendant’s role 
during the change of plea process. Specifically, Rule 11 should be amended 
to require that courts seek elaborative defendant statements that reflect their 
knowledge of the various consequences (constitutional, penal, appellate, 
etc.) that accompany a change of plea, the voluntariness of their plea, the 
factual basis underlying their plea, and their understanding of the nature of 
the charges. The rule should strongly discourage the employment of leading 
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questions,259 and flatly prohibit compound questions, when conducting this 
inquiry. Instead, the judicial colloquy should be conducted in such a manner 
that encourages elaborative, explanatory statements from the defendants. 
Undoubtedly, there will be plentiful instances where defendants exhibit 
traits, such as insufficient comprehension, inarticulateness, or extreme 
nervousness, that inhibit a seamless Rule 11 hearing. When confronted with 
such scenarios, the proposed rule changes will not meaningfully curtail ju-
dicial freedom to address these scenarios. Courts can still employ a variety 
of strategies to address such situations, including, but hardly limited to, 
permitting attorney consultation, granting recesses, rescheduling hearings, 
and, if necessary, asking limited leading questions. 
Critics will correctly argue that this proposal will greatly elongate the 
Rule 11-hearing process. However, the current change-of-plea structure is 
far too streamlined and expedient, and is an inappropriate yardstick by 
which to assess the efficiency of this proposed reform. The proposed Rule 
11 reform will produce a Rule 11 process that is elongated but truer to its 
purported purpose: to accurately gauge defendant knowledge and voluntari-
ness. And the greater attendant accuracy will result in fewer appellate chal-
lenges alleging Rule 11 errors, or related claims such as those litigated in 
the Supreme Court cases of Class and Lee. 
Approximately ninety-seven percent of federal cases and ninety-four 
percent of felony convictions at the state level are obtained by virtue of plea 
bargaining.260 Such heavy reliance upon guilty pleas to resolve criminal cases 
necessitates a corresponding Rule 11 process that respects this value choice. It 
requires a process that places less value upon haste and more upon effective-
ness. As the Class and Lee cases illustrate, a more careful Rule 11 process 
                                                                                                                           
 259 Leading questions should be allowed in limited circumstances, such as when there is suffi-
cient indication that the defendant has difficulty expressing himself. See 3 CRIMINAL PRACTICE 
MANUAL, REPORT, AND GUIDE § 77:6, Westlaw (database updated 2019) (“To simplify the pro-
cess of extracting information from witnesses with limited understanding, whether due to mental 
capacity, immaturity, extreme nervousness, fear, inexperience, or other impediments, the court 
may permit leading questions. . . . Leading questions on direct examination are permissible in 
questioning certain witnesses, including a child sexual abuse victim, a foreign witness testifying 
through a translator, an unusually soft-spoken and frightened witness, and a mentally retarded 
adult who was the victim of sexual abuse and do not violate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right 
to confrontation.”). 
 260 Emily Yoffe, Innocence Is Irrelevant, THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 2017), https://www.the
atlantic.com/magazine/archive/2017/09/innocence-is-irrelevant/534171/ [https://perma.cc/7EET-
3WN3] (“The vast majority of felony convictions are now the result of plea bargains—some 94% at 
the state level, and some 97% at the federal level. Estimates for misdemeanor convictions run even 
higher. These are astonishing statistics, and they reveal a stark new truth about the American crimi-
nal-justice system: Very few cases go to trial.”); see Gaby Del Valle, Most Cases End in Plea Bar-
gains, Not Trials, THE OUTLINE (Aug. 7, 2017), https://theoutline.com/post/2066/most-criminal-
cases-end-in-plea-bargains-not-trials?zd=1&zi=uraey74x [https://perma.cc/NJQ7-RVRB]. 
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might have produced more optimal and efficient outcomes for the respective 
litigants, and possibly avoided the appellate litigation that made their way to 
the Supreme Court. The recommended proposal is an important corrective 
step in making the Rule 11 process more effective and just. 
